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Introduction This document specifies the derivation of the content-encryption key for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) enveloped-data content type , the content-encryption key for the CMS encrypted-data content type , or the content-authenticated-encryption key for the authenticated-enveloped-data content type . The use of this mechanism provides protection against an attacker that manipulates the content-encryption algorithm identifier or the content-authenticated-encryption algorithm identifier. Johannes Roth and Falko Strenzke presented such an attack at IETF 118 , where:
  1. The attacker intercepts a CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content that uses either AES-CCM or AES-GCM .
  2. The attacker turns the intercepted content into a "garbage" CMS enveloped-data content ( ) that is composed of AES-CBC guess blocks.
  3. The attacker sends the "garbage" message to the victim, and the victim reveals the result of the decryption to the attacker.
  4. If any of the transformed plaintext blocks match the guess for that block, then the attacker learns the plaintext for that block.
With highly structured messages, one block can reveal the only sensitive part of the original message. This attack is thwarted if the encryption key depends upon the delivery of the unmodified algorithm identifier. The mitigation for this attack has three parts:
  1. Potential recipients include the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier (with no parameters) in S/MIME Capabilities to indicate support for this mitigation.
  2. As a flag to the recipient that this mitigation is being used, carry the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier as the contentEncryptionAlgorithm in the EncryptedContentInfo structure. This structure is used in the enveloped-data content type, the encrypted-data content type, and the authenticated-enveloped-data content type. The parameters field of the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier identifies the content-encryption algorithm or the content-authenticated-encryption algorithm and any associated parameters.
  3. Perform encryption with a derived content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key: CEK' = HKDF(CEK, AlgorithmIdentifier)
ASN.1 CMS values are generated using ASN.1 , using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) . Terminology The key words " MUST ", " MUST NOT ", " REQUIRED ", " SHALL ", " SHALL NOT ", " SHOULD ", " SHOULD NOT ", " RECOMMENDED ", " NOT RECOMMENDED ", " MAY ", and " OPTIONAL " in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Cryptographic Algorithm Agility Considerations There is no provision for key derivation functions other than HKDF, and there is no provision for hash functions other than SHA-256. If there is ever a need to support another key derivation function or another hash function, it will be very straightforward to assign a new object identifier. At this point, keeping the design very simple seems most important. Use of HKDF with SHA-256 to Derive Encryption Keys The mitigation uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) to derive output keying material (OKM) from input keying material (IKM). HKDF is used with the SHA-256 hash function . The derivation includes the DER-encoded AlgorithmIdentifier as the optional info input value. The encoded value includes the ASN.1 tag for SEQUENCE (0x30), the length, and the value. This AlgorithmIdentifier is carried as the parameter to the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier. If an attacker were to change the originator-provided AlgorithmIdentifier, then the recipient will derive a different content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key. The CMS_CEK_HKDF_SHA256 function uses the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand functions to derive the OKM from the IKM:
Inputs:
IKM
input keying material
info
DER-encoded AlgorithmIdentifier
Output:
OKM
output keying material (same size as IKM)
The output OKM is calculated as follows: OKM_SIZE = len(IKM) /* length in octets */ IF OKM_SIZE > 8160 THEN raise error salt = "The Cryptographic Message Syntax" PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) OKM = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, OKM_SIZE) The id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 Algorithm Identifier The id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier indicates that the CMS_CEK_HKDF_SHA256 function defined in is used to derive the content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key. The following object identifier identifies the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm: id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) alg(3) 31 } The id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 parameters field has an ASN.1 type of AlgorithmIdentifier. Using the conventions from , the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier is defined as: ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, { ... } } cea-CEKHKDFSHA256 CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 PARAMS TYPE ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ARE required SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 } } SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions The SMIMECapabilities attribute is defined in . An S/MIME client announces the set of cryptographic functions it supports using the SMIMECapabilities attribute. If an S/MIME client supports the mechanism in this document, the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 object identifier SHOULD be included in the set of cryptographic functions. The parameter with this encoding MUST be absent. The encoding for id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256, in hexadecimal, is: 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 1f Use of HKDF with SHA-256 with CMS This section describes the originator and recipient processing to implement this mitigation for each of the CMS encrypting content types. Enveloped-Data Content Type The fourth step of constructing an enveloped-data content type is repeated below from :
  1. The content is encrypted with the content-encryption key. Content encryption may require that the content be padded to a multiple of some block size; see Section .
To implement this mitigation, the originator expands this step as follows: The presence of the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier in the contentEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure tells the recipient to derive the new content-encryption key (CEK') as shown above, and then use it for decryption of the EncryptedContent. If the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier is not present in the contentEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure, then the recipient uses the original content-encryption key (CEK) for decryption of the EncryptedContent. Encrypted-Data Content Type As specified in , the content-encryption key is managed by other means. To implement this mitigation, the originator performs the following: The presence of the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier in the contentEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure tells the recipient to derive the new content-encryption key (CEK') as shown above, and then use it for decryption of the EncryptedContent. If the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier is not present in the contentEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure, then the recipient uses the original content-encryption key (CEK) for decryption of the EncryptedContent. Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type The fifth step of constructing an authenticated-enveloped-data content type is repeated below from :
  1. The attributes collected in step 4 are authenticated and the CMS content is authenticated and encrypted with the content- authenticated-encryption key. If the authenticated encryption algorithm requires either the additional authenticated data (AAD) or the content to be padded to a multiple of some block size, then the padding is added as described in Section of [CMS].
Note that [CMS] refers to , which has been obsoleted by , but the text in Section 6.3 was unchanged in RFC 5652. To implement this mitigation, the originator expands this step as follows: The presence of the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier in the contentEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure tells the recipient to derive the new content-authenticated-encryption key (CEK') as shown above, and then use it for authenticated decryption of the EncryptedContent and the authentication of the AAD. If the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier is not present in the contentEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure, then the recipient uses the original content-authenticated-encryption (CEK) for decryption and authentication of the EncryptedContent and the authentication of the AAD. Security Considerations This mitigation always uses HKDF with SHA-256. One KDF algorithm was selected to avoid the need for negotiation. In the future, if a weakness is found in the KDF algorithm, a new attribute will need to be assigned for use with an alternative KDF algorithm. If the attacker removes the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 object identifier from the contentEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure prior to delivery to the recipient, then the recipient will not attempt to derive CEK', which will deny the recipient access to the content but will not assist the attacker in recovering the plaintext content. If the attacker changes contentEncryptionAlgorithm.parameters field of the EncryptedContentInfo structure prior to delivery to the recipient, then the recipient will derive a different CEK', which will not assist the attacker in recovering the plaintext content. Providing the object identifier as an input to the key derivation function is sufficient to mitigate the attack described in , but this mitigation includes both the object identifier and the parameters to protect against some yet-to-be-discovered attack that only manipulates the parameters. Implementations MUST protect the content-encryption keys and content-authenticated-encryption keys, including the CEK and CEK'. Compromise of a content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated encrypted content. Compromise of a content-authenticated-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated encrypted content or allow modification of the authenticated content and the AAD. Implementations MUST randomly generate content-encryption keys and content-authenticated-encryption keys. Using an inadequate pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys and then search the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute-force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. offers important guidance on this topic. Privacy Considerations If the message-digest attribute is included in the AuthAttributes, then the attribute value will contain the unencrypted one-way hash value of the plaintext of the content. Disclosure of this hash value enables content tracking, and it can be used to determine if the content matches one or more candidates. For these reasons, the AuthAttributes SHOULD NOT contain the message-digest attribute. Operational Considerations CMS is often used to provide encryption in messaging environments, where various forms of unsolicited messages (such as spam and phishing) represent a significant volume of unwanted traffic. Mitigation strategies for unwanted message traffic involve analysis of plaintext message content. When recipients accept unsolicited encrypted messages, they become even more vulnerable to unwanted traffic since many mitigation strategies will be unable to access the plaintext message content. Therefore, software that receives messages that have been encrypted using CMS ought to provide alternate mechanisms to handle the unwanted message traffic. One approach that does not require disclosure of keying material to a server is to reject or discard encrypted messages unless they purport to come from a member of a previously approved originator list. IANA Considerations For the ASN.1 module in of this document, IANA has assigned the following object identifier (OID) in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry: Decimal Description References 80 id-mod-CMS-CEK-HKDF-SHA256-2023 RFC 9709 IANA has allocated the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 algorithm identifier as specified in in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)" registry as follows: Decimal Description References 31 id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 RFC 9709

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