RetroSearch Browse

Tue Jan 3 23:02:19 CET 2012 · https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2012-January/115276.html

Christian Heimes <lists at cheimes.de> wrote:

> Am 29.12.2011 12:13, schrieb Mark Shannon:
> > The attack relies on being able to predict the hash value for a given
> > string. Randomising the string hash function is quite straightforward.
> > There is no need to change the dictionary code.
> > 
> > A possible (*untested*) patch is attached. I'll leave it for those more 
> > familiar with unicodeobject.c to do properly.
> 
> I'm worried that hash randomization of str is going to break 3rd party
> software that rely on a stable hash across multiple Python instances.
> Persistence layers like ZODB and cross interpreter communication
> channels used by multiprocessing may (!) rely on the fact that the hash
> of a string is fixed.

Software that depends on an undefined hash function for synchronization
and persistence deserves to break, IMO.  There are plenty of
well-defined hash functions available for this purpose.

Bill

Home - News ( United States | United Kingdom | Italy | Germany ) - Football scores

Showing content from https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2012-January/115276.html below:

[Python-Dev] Hash collision security issue (now public)