+95
-22
lines changedFilter options
+95
-22
lines changed Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -96,12 +96,13 @@ def get_host(self):
96 96
"""Return the HTTP host using the environment or request headers."""
97 97
host = self._get_raw_host()
98 98 99 -
# There is no hostname validation when DEBUG=True
100 -
if settings.DEBUG:
101 -
return host
99 +
# Allow variants of localhost if ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG=True.
100 +
allowed_hosts = settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
101 +
if settings.DEBUG and not allowed_hosts:
102 +
allowed_hosts = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]']
102 103 103 104
domain, port = split_domain_port(host)
104 -
if domain and validate_host(domain, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS):
105 +
if domain and validate_host(domain, allowed_hosts):
105 106
return host
106 107
else:
107 108
msg = "Invalid HTTP_HOST header: %r." % host
@@ -90,14 +90,19 @@ If the ``Host`` header (or ``X-Forwarded-Host`` if
90 90
list, the :meth:`django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()` method will raise
91 91
:exc:`~django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
92 92 93 -
When :setting:`DEBUG` is ``True`` or when running tests, host validation is
94 -
disabled; any host will be accepted. Thus it's usually only necessary to set it
95 -
in production.
93 +
When :setting:`DEBUG` is ``True`` and ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty, the host
94 +
is validated against ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]']``.
96 95 97 96
This validation only applies via :meth:`~django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()`;
98 97
if your code accesses the ``Host`` header directly from ``request.META`` you
99 98
are bypassing this security protection.
100 99 100 +
.. versionchanged:: 1.10.3
101 + 102 +
In older versions, ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` wasn't checked if ``DEBUG=True``.
103 +
This was also changed in Django 1.9.11 and 1.8.16 to prevent a
104 +
DNS rebinding attack.
105 + 101 106
.. setting:: APPEND_SLASH
102 107 103 108
``APPEND_SLASH``
@@ -20,6 +20,28 @@ the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option or if the user has an active session
20 20 21 21
A randomly generated password is now used for each test run.
22 22 23 +
DNS rebinding vulnerability when ``DEBUG=True``
24 +
===============================================
25 + 26 +
Older versions of Django don't validate the ``Host`` header against
27 +
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` when ``settings.DEBUG=True``. This makes them
28 +
vulnerable to a `DNS rebinding attack
29 +
<http://benmmurphy.github.io/blog/2016/07/11/rails-webconsole-dns-rebinding/>`_.
30 + 31 +
While Django doesn't ship a module that allows remote code execution, this is
32 +
at least a cross-site scripting vector, which could be quite serious if
33 +
developers load a copy of the production database in development or connect to
34 +
some production services for which there's no development instance, for
35 +
example. If a project uses a package like the ``django-debug-toolbar``, then
36 +
the attacker could execute arbitrary SQL, which could be especially bad if the
37 +
developers connect to the database with a superuser account.
38 + 39 +
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is now validated regardless of ``DEBUG``. For
40 +
convenience, if ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty and ``DEBUG=True``, the following
41 +
variations of localhost are allowed ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']``. If
42 +
your local settings file has your production ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` value, you must
43 +
now omit it to get those fallback values.
44 + 23 45
Bugfixes
24 46
========
25 47
@@ -19,3 +19,25 @@ the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option or if the user has an active session
19 19
(such as an attacker's connection).
20 20 21 21
A randomly generated password is now used for each test run.
22 + 23 +
DNS rebinding vulnerability when ``DEBUG=True``
24 +
===============================================
25 + 26 +
Older versions of Django don't validate the ``Host`` header against
27 +
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` when ``settings.DEBUG=True``. This makes them
28 +
vulnerable to a `DNS rebinding attack
29 +
<http://benmmurphy.github.io/blog/2016/07/11/rails-webconsole-dns-rebinding/>`_.
30 + 31 +
While Django doesn't ship a module that allows remote code execution, this is
32 +
at least a cross-site scripting vector, which could be quite serious if
33 +
developers load a copy of the production database in development or connect to
34 +
some production services for which there's no development instance, for
35 +
example. If a project uses a package like the ``django-debug-toolbar``, then
36 +
the attacker could execute arbitrary SQL, which could be especially bad if the
37 +
developers connect to the database with a superuser account.
38 + 39 +
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is now validated regardless of ``DEBUG``. For
40 +
convenience, if ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty and ``DEBUG=True``, the following
41 +
variations of localhost are allowed ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']``. If
42 +
your local settings file has your production ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` value, you must
43 +
now omit it to get those fallback values.
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -19,3 +19,25 @@ the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option or if the user has an active session
19 19
(such as an attacker's connection).
20 20 21 21
A randomly generated password is now used for each test run.
22 + 23 +
DNS rebinding vulnerability when ``DEBUG=True``
24 +
===============================================
25 + 26 +
Older versions of Django don't validate the ``Host`` header against
27 +
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` when ``settings.DEBUG=True``. This makes them
28 +
vulnerable to a `DNS rebinding attack
29 +
<http://benmmurphy.github.io/blog/2016/07/11/rails-webconsole-dns-rebinding/>`_.
30 + 31 +
While Django doesn't ship a module that allows remote code execution, this is
32 +
at least a cross-site scripting vector, which could be quite serious if
33 +
developers load a copy of the production database in development or connect to
34 +
some production services for which there's no development instance, for
35 +
example. If a project uses a package like the ``django-debug-toolbar``, then
36 +
the attacker could execute arbitrary SQL, which could be especially bad if the
37 +
developers connect to the database with a superuser account.
38 + 39 +
``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is now validated regardless of ``DEBUG``. For
40 +
convenience, if ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty and ``DEBUG=True``, the following
41 +
variations of localhost are allowed ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']``. If
42 +
your local settings file has your production ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` value, you must
43 +
now omit it to get those fallback values.
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ def test_bare_secret_accepted_and_replaced(self):
377 377
self.assertEqual(len(csrf_cookie.value), CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH)
378 378
self._check_token_present(resp, csrf_id=csrf_cookie.value)
379 379 380 -
@override_settings(DEBUG=True)
380 +
@override_settings(DEBUG=True, ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'])
381 381
def test_https_bad_referer(self):
382 382
"""
383 383
Test that a POST HTTPS request with a bad referer is rejected
@@ -756,21 +756,22 @@ def test_get_port_with_x_forwarded_port(self):
756 756
self.assertEqual(request.get_port(), '8080')
757 757 758 758
@override_settings(DEBUG=True, ALLOWED_HOSTS=[])
759 -
def test_host_validation_disabled_in_debug_mode(self):
760 -
"""If ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is True, all hosts pass."""
761 -
request = HttpRequest()
762 -
request.META = {
763 -
'HTTP_HOST': 'example.com',
764 -
}
765 -
self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'example.com')
759 +
def test_host_validation_in_debug_mode(self):
760 +
"""
761 +
If ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is True, variants of localhost are
762 +
allowed.
763 +
"""
764 +
valid_hosts = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]']
765 +
for host in valid_hosts:
766 +
request = HttpRequest()
767 +
request.META = {'HTTP_HOST': host}
768 +
self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), host)
766 769 767 -
# Invalid hostnames would normally raise a SuspiciousOperation,
768 -
# but we have DEBUG=True, so this check is disabled.
769 -
request = HttpRequest()
770 -
request.META = {
771 -
'HTTP_HOST': "invalid_hostname.com",
772 -
}
773 -
self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), "invalid_hostname.com")
770 +
# Other hostnames raise a SuspiciousOperation.
771 +
with self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation):
772 +
request = HttpRequest()
773 +
request.META = {'HTTP_HOST': 'example.com'}
774 +
request.get_host()
774 775 775 776
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=[])
776 777
def test_get_host_suggestion_of_allowed_host(self):
You can’t perform that action at this time.
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