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FIPS 140-2 and 140-3 | GitLab Docs

FIPS is short for “Federal Information Processing Standard”, which defines certain security practices for a “cryptographic module” (CM). A cryptographic module is set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements approved security functions (including cryptographic algorithms and key generation) and is contained within a cryptographic boundary.

At GitLab, a cryptographic module almost always refers to an embedded software component of another product or package release and is specific to a particular version of a binary. For example, a particular version of Ubuntu Kernel Crypto API cryptographic module or the OpenSSL project’s FIPS Provider.

A module is validated after it completes testing by a NIST-certified laboratory and has an active certificate listed in the Cryptographic Module Validation Program. A cryptographic module must be compiled, installed, and configured according to its CMVP security policy.

GitLab is committed to releasing software for our customers who are required to comply with FIPS 140-2 and 140-3.

FIPS 140 is a requirement to do business within the U.S. public sector, as well as some non-U.S. public sector organizations and certain industries depending on the use case (healthcare, banking, etc.). FIPS 140-2 and FIPS 140-3 requirements are applicable to all U.S. Federal agencies, including software they purchase whether that be self-managed or cloud. Agencies must use cryptographic-based security systems to provide adequate information security for all operations and assets as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3.

Non-validated cryptography is currently viewed as providing no protection to the information or data. In effect, the data would be considered unprotected plaintext. If the agency specifies that the information or data be cryptographically protected, then FIPS 140-2 or FIPS 140-3 is applicable. In essence, if cryptography is required, then it must be validated. Should the cryptographic module be revoked, use of that module is no longer permitted.

The challenge is that the use of FIPS-validated modules requires use of specific versions of a software package or binary. Historically, some organizations would pin or version-lock to maintain compliance. The problem is that these validated modules inevitably become vulnerable, and the long lead time associated with obtaining validation for a new version means it is impractical to consistently achieve both federal mandates:

• Use of validated modules.
• The timely mitigation of vulnerabilities.

The regulatory environment and policymaking in this area is dynamic and requires close monitoring by GitLab.

These phases are used extensively at GitLab and among software providers. However, we should aim to avoid using them and update our documentation.

• “FIPS compliant” or “FIPS compliance”: These are not official terms defined by NIST or CMVP and therefore should not be used because it leaves room for ambiguity or subjective interpretations.
  • Compliance with FIPS 140 requires adherence to the entire standard and all security requirements for cryptographic modules, including the strict use of CMVP-validated modules, CMVP-approved security functions, CMVP-approved sensitive parameter generation and establishment methods, and CMVP approved authentication mechanisms.
  • This term is often synonymous with using “CMVP-approved security functions”, which is only one aspect of the standard.

The following official terms and phrases are approved for use by the CMVP.

• “FIPS 140-2 Validated” or “FIPS-validated” when referring to cryptographic modules that have a CMVP certificate and number.
• “FIPS 140-2 Inside” or “FIPS inside” when referring to a product that embeds FIPS-validated modules, such as GitLab, a GitLab software component, or GitLab-distributed software. If a product has a FIPS 140-2 module internal to the product and uses a FIPS official logo, “FIPS 140-2 Inside” and the certificate number must also accompany the logo.
• “CMVP-approved security functions” or “FIPS-approved algorithms”: While technically the latter is not an official phrase, it communicates the same thing and provides additional context to those who are unfamiliar with NIST terminology. This is referring to NIST SP 800-140C which specifies the CMVP-approved cryptographic algorithms and their authorized use cases.

GitLab is a SaaS First company and, as such, we follow the latest guidance from the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). FedRAMP requires cloud service providers to use FIPS-validated cryptographic modules everywhere cryptography is required including for encryption, hashing, random number generation, and key generation. However, per control SC-13 from the FedRAMP security controls baseline, it is acceptable to use a cryptographic module that is not FIPS-validated when:

• A FIPS-validated version has a known vulnerability.
• A feature with vulnerability is in use.
• A non-FIPS version fixes the vulnerability.
• The non-FIPS version is submitted to NIST for FIPS validation. That is, listed under Modules In Process or Implementation Under Test on CMVP website.
• POA&M is added to track approval and deployment when ready.

FedRAMP released a draft (read: subject to change) Policy for Cryptographic Module Selection and Use which aims to provide more practical implementation guidance. Notably, the preference to remediate known vulnerabilities through patches or updates over continuing to use known-vulnerable software that is FIPS-validated because the presence of known vulnerabilities creates risks that outweigh the assurance value provided through validation.

As required by CSP01 in this draft policy, GitLab takes the stance of applying patches to cryptographic modules. The order of preference for cryptographic module selection per CSP10 is as follows:

1. Mitigate the vulnerability in the validated module.
2. Use an unvalidated module, in the following order of preference:
   • Module is substantially similar to a FIPS-validated module; validated algorithm.
   • FIPS validation in process for module; validated algorithm.
   • Expired FIPS validation for a previously validated module; validated algorithm.
   • Module not in FIPS validation process; validated algorithm.
   • Algorithm is approved and tested but not yet validated, and the module is not in FIPS validation process.

Third party assessment organizations (3PAOs) validate the use of a FIPS-validated CM by:

1. Checking the certificate number.
2. Validating that the CM is configured in an approved mode and only uses algorithms listed as approved in the CM’s security policy.

GitLab also does internal continuous monitoring and, in the past, has contracted independent auditors to audit our software against the FIPS 140 standard. Results are available in the Trust Center.

GitLab currently releases software for Omnibus (Linux package) deployments, cloud-native (Helm chart) deployments, GitLab Runner, security analyzers, and more. As stated above, GitLab follows FedRAMP guidance and, as such, we strive to include FIPS 140-2 validated modules (FIPS inside) when possible but, at minimum, includes FIPS-approved algorithms (CMVP-approved security functions). GitLab favors security over compliance in situations where it is not possible to achieve both with respect to FIPS 140-2.

Some GitLab features may not work when FIPS mode is enabled. The following features are known to not work in FIPS mode. However, there may be additional features not listed here that also do not work properly in FIPS mode:

• Container Scanning support for scanning images in repositories that require authentication.
• Code Quality does not support operating in FIPS-compliant mode.
• Dependency scanning support for Gradle.
• Solutions for vulnerabilities for yarn projects.
• Static Application Security Testing (SAST) supports a reduced set of analyzers when operating in FIPS-compliant mode.
• Operational Container Scanning.

Additionally, these package repositories are disabled in FIPS mode:

• Conan 1 package repository.
• Conan 2 package repository.
• Debian package repository.

For more information, refer to the information above and see the GitLab Cryptography Standard. Reach out to #sec-assurance with questions or open an MR if something needs to be clarified.

Here are some guidelines for developing GitLab FIPS-approved software:

• We should make most, if not all, cryptographic calls use a FIPS-validated OpenSSL (example), whether that be:

  • Embedded as part of an operating system or container base image (preferred).
  • Standalone.

  OpenSSL 3.0 now makes it possible to use a CMVP-validated module called the OpenSSL FIPS Provider fips.so while also allowing security patches to the rest of OpenSSL without invalidating the module (refer to OpenSSL README-FIPS.md). This is also now available to consume on RHEL 9 and UBI9 (CMVP certificate #4746).

• We should avoid non-approved cryptographic algorithms (for example, MD5) and switch to an approved FIPS 140-3 algorithm (for example, SHA256). Because MD5 is cryptographically broken, this is a good practice.

• There may be instances where a non-approved cryptographic algorithm can be used for non-cryptographic purposes. For example, SHA1 is not a FIPS 140-3 algorithm, but because Git uses it for non-cryptographic purposes, we can use it. In these cases, we must document why it’s not being used for cryptographic purposes, or disable the feature outright.

• Backwards compatibility. There may be some features where switching algorithms would break existing functionality. For example, the database stores passwords encrypted with bcrypt, and these passwords cannot be re-encrypted without user help.

1. GitLab has standardized on RHEL and UBI for its FIPS-approved software releases and we should use the patterns outline below for Ruby, Go, CNG, Omnibus, and other software such as Runner, Secure analyzers, etc.

This guide is specifically for public users or GitLab team members with a requirement to run a production instance of GitLab that is FIPS compliant. This guide outlines a hybrid deployment using elements from both Omnibus and our Cloud Native GitLab installations.

• Amazon Web Services account. Our first target environment is running on AWS, and uses other FIPS Compliant AWS resources. For many AWS resources, you must use a FIPS specific endpoint.
• Ability to run Ubuntu 20.04 machines for GitLab. Our first target environment uses the hybrid architecture.
• Advanced Search: GitLab does not provide a packaged Elastic or OpenSearch deployment. You must use a FIPS-compliant service or disable Advanced Search.

You can use the GitLab Environment Toolkit to spin up a FIPS-enabled cluster for development and testing. As mentioned in the prerequisites, these instructions use Amazon Web Services (AWS) because that is the first target environment.

To get started, your AWS account must subscribe to a FIPS-enabled Amazon Machine Image (AMI) in the AWS Marketplace console.

This example assumes that the Ubuntu Pro 20.04 FIPS LTS AMI by Canonical Group Limited has been added your account. This operating system is used for virtual machines running in Amazon EC2.

The simplest way to get a FIPS-enabled GitLab cluster is to use an Omnibus reference architecture. See the GET Quick Start Guide for more details. The following instructions build on the Quick Start and are also necessary for Cloud Native Hybrid installations.

GitLab team members can view more information in this internal handbook page on how to use FIPS AMI: https://internal.gitlab.com/handbook/engineering/fedramp-compliance/get-configure/#terraform---use-fips-ami

The standard Omnibus GitLab releases build their own OpenSSL library, which is not FIPS-validated. However, we have nightly builds that create Omnibus packages that link against the operating system’s OpenSSL library. To use this package, update the gitlab_edition and gitlab_repo_script_url fields in the Ansible vars.yml.

GitLab team members can view more information in this internal handbook page on Ansible (AWS): https://internal.gitlab.com/handbook/engineering/fedramp-compliance/get-configure/#ansible-aws

A Cloud Native Hybrid install uses both Omnibus and Cloud Native GitLab (CNG) images. The previous instructions cover the Omnibus part, but two additional steps are needed to enable FIPS in CNG:

1. Use a custom Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) AMI.
2. Use GitLab containers built with RedHat’s Universal Base Image (UBI).

Because Amazon does not yet publish a FIPS-enabled AMI, you have to build one yourself with Packer.

Amazon publishes the following Git repositories with information about custom EKS AMIs:

• Amazon EKS AMI Build Specification
• Sample EKS custom AMIs

This GitHub pull request makes it possible to create an Amazon Linux 2 EKS AMI with FIPS enabled for Kubernetes v1.21. To build an image:

1. Install Packer.

2. Run the following:

   git clone https://github.com/awslabs/amazon-eks-ami
   cd amazon-eks-ami
   git fetch origin pull/898/head:fips-ami
   git checkout fips-ami
   AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1 make 1.21-fips # Be sure to set the region accordingly

If you are using a different version of Kubernetes, adjust the make command and Makefile accordingly.

When the AMI build is done, a new AMI should be created with a message such as the following:

==> Builds finished. The artifacts of successful builds are:
--> amazon-ebs: AMIs were created:
us-west-2: ami-0a25e760cd00b027e

In this example, the AMI ID is ami-0a25e760cd00b027e, but your value may be different.

Building a RHEL-based system with FIPS enabled should be possible, but there is an outstanding issue preventing the Packer build from completing.

Because this builds a custom AMI based on a specific version of an image, you must periodically rebuild the custom AMI to keep current with the latest security patches and upgrades.

GitLab team members can view more information in this internal handbook page on how to use a custom EKS AMI: https://internal.gitlab.com/handbook/engineering/fedramp-compliance/get-configure/#terraform---use-a-custom-eks-ami

CNG uses a Helm Chart to manage which container images to deploy. To use UBI-based containers, edit the Ansible vars.yml to use custom Charts variables:

all:
  vars:
    # ...
    gitlab_charts_custom_config_file: '/path/to/gitlab-environment-toolkit/ansible/environments/gitlab-10k/inventory/charts.yml'

Now create charts.yml in the location specified above and specify tags with a -fips suffix.

See our Charts documentation on FIPS for more details, including an example values file as a reference.

You can also use release tags, but the versioning is tricky because each component may use its own versioning scheme. For example, for GitLab v15.2:

global:
  image:
    tagSuffix: -fips
  certificates:
    image:
      tag: 20211220-r0
  kubectl:
    image:
      tag: 1.18.20

gitlab:
  gitaly:
    image:
      tag: v15.2.0
  gitlab-exporter:
    image:
      tag: 11.17.1
  gitlab-shell:
    image:
      tag: v14.9.0
  gitlab-mailroom:
    image:
      tag: v15.2.0
  gitlab-pages:
    image:
      tag: v1.61.0
  migrations:
    image:
      tag: v15.2.0
  sidekiq:
    image:
      tag: v15.2.0
  toolbox:
    image:
      tag: v15.2.0
  webservice:
    image:
      tag: v15.2.0
    workhorse:
      tag: v15.2.0

The Quality Engineering Enablement team assists these efforts by checking if FIPS-enabled environments perform well compared to non-FIPS environments.

Testing shows an impact in some places, such as Gitaly SSL, but it’s not large enough to impact customers.

You can find more information on FIPS performance benchmarking in the following issue:

• Benchmark performance of FIPS reference architecture

The simplest approach is to set up a virtual machine running Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.

Red Hat provide free licenses to developers, and permit the CD image to be downloaded from the Red Hat developer’s portal. Registration is required.

After the virtual machine is set up, you can follow the GDK installation instructions, including the advanced instructions for RHEL. The asdf tool is not used for dependency management because it’s essential to use the RedHat-provided Go compiler and other system dependencies.

After GDK and its dependencies are installed, run this command (as root) and restart the virtual machine:

You can check whether it’s taken effect by running:

In this environment, OpenSSL refuses to perform cryptographic operations forbidden by the FIPS standards. This enables you to reproduce FIPS-related bugs, and validate fixes.

You should be able to open a web browser inside the virtual machine and sign in to the GitLab instance.

You can disable FIPS mode again by running this command, then restarting the virtual machine:

fips-mode-setup --disable

You can query Gitlab::FIPS in Ruby code to determine if the instance is FIPS-enabled:

def default_min_key_size(name)
  if Gitlab::FIPS.enabled?
    Gitlab::SSHPublicKey.supported_sizes(name).select(&:positive?).min || -1
  else
    0
  end
end

GitLab has a dedicated repository (gitlab/gitlab-fips) for builds of the Omnibus GitLab which are built with FIPS compliance. These GitLab builds are compiled to use the system OpenSSL, instead of the Omnibus-embedded version of OpenSSL. These packages are built for:

• RHEL 8 and 9 (and compatible)
• AmazonLinux 2 and 2023
• Ubuntu 20.04

These are consumed by the GitLab Environment Toolkit (GET).

See the section on how FIPS builds are created.

Because of a bug, FIPS Linux packages for GitLab 17.6 and earlier did not use the system Libgcrypt, but the same Libgcrypt bundled with regular Linux packages.

This issue is fixed for all FIPS Linux packages for GitLab 17.7, except for AmazonLinux 2. The Libgcrypt version of AmazonLinux 2 is not compatible with the GPGME and GnuPG versions shipped with the FIPS Linux packages.

FIPS Linux packages for AmazonLinux 2 will continue to use the same Libgcrypt bundled with the regular Linux packages, otherwise we would have to downgrade GPGME and GnuPG.

If you require full compliance, you must migrate to another operating system for which FIPS Linux packages are available.

The Distribution team has created nightly FIPS Omnibus builds, which can be used for testing purposes. These should never be used for production environments.

See the documentation on installing a FIPS-compliant GitLab Runner.

The following sections describe ways you can verify if FIPS is enabled.

$ cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
1

$ /opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/irb
irb(main):001:0> require 'openssl'; OpenSSL.fips_mode
=> true

$ irb
irb(main):001:0> require 'openssl'; OpenSSL.fips_mode
=> true

Google maintains a dev.boringcrypto branch in the Go compiler that makes it possible to statically link BoringSSL, a FIPS-validated module forked from OpenSSL. However, BoringCrypto is not officially supported, although it is used by other companies.

GitLab uses golang-fips, a fork of the dev.boringcrypto branch to build Go programs that dynamically link OpenSSL via dlopen. This has several advantages:

• Using a FIPS-validated, system OpenSSL (RHEL/UBI) is straightforward.
• This is the source code used by the Red Hat go-toolset package.
• Unlike go-toolset, this fork appears to keep up with the latest Go releases.

However, cgo must be enabled via CGO_ENABLED=1 for this to work. There is a performance hit when calling into C code.

Projects that are compiled with golang-fips on Linux x86 automatically get built the crypto routines that use OpenSSL. While the boringcrypto build tag is automatically present, no extra build tags are actually needed. There are specific build tags that disable these crypto hooks.

We can check whether a given binary is using OpenSSL via go tool nm and look for symbols named Cfunc__goboringcrypto or crypto/internal/boring/sig.BoringCrypto.

For example:

$ # Find in a Golang-FIPS 1.17 library
$ go tool nm nginx-ingress-controller | grep '_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_|\bcrypto/internal/boring/sig\.BoringCrypto' | tail
 2a0b650 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_SHA384_Final
 2a0b658 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_SHA384_Init
 2a0b660 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_SHA384_Update
 2a0b668 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_SHA512_Final
 2a0b670 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_SHA512_Init
 2a0b678 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_SHA512_Update
 2a0b680 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_internal_ECDSA_sign
 2a0b688 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_internal_ECDSA_verify
 2a0b690 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_internal_ERR_error_string_n
 2a0b698 D crypto/internal/boring._cgo_71ae3cd1ca33_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_internal_ERR_get_error
$ # Find in a Golang-FIPS 1.22 library
$ go tool nm tenctl | grep '_Cfunc__goboringcrypto_|\bcrypto/internal/boring/sig\.BoringCrypto'
  4cb840 t crypto/internal/boring/sig.BoringCrypto.abi0

In addition, LabKit contains routines to check whether FIPS is enabled.

Many GitLab projects (for example: Gitaly, GitLab Pages) have standardized on using FIPS_MODE=1 make to build FIPS binaries locally.

The Omnibus FIPS builds are triggered with the USE_SYSTEM_SSL environment variable set to true. When this environment variable is set, the Omnibus recipes dependencies such as curl, NGINX, and libgit2 will link against the system OpenSSL. OpenSSL will NOT be included in the Omnibus build.

The Omnibus builds are created using container images that use the golang-fips compiler. For example, this job created the registry.gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-omnibus-builder/centos_8_fips:3.3.1 image used to build packages for RHEL 8.

First, you need to make sure there is an Omnibus builder image for the desired Linux distribution. The images used to build Omnibus packages are created with Omnibus Builder images.

Review this merge request. A new image can be added by:

1. Adding CI jobs with the _fips suffix (for example: ubuntu_18.04_fips).
2. Making sure the Dockerfile uses Snippets.new(fips: fips).populate instead of Snippets.new.populate.

After this image has been tagged, add a new CI job to Omnibus GitLab.

The Cloud Native GitLab CI pipeline generates images using several base images:

• Debian
• The Red Hat Universal Base Image (UBI)

UBI images ship with the same OpenSSL package as those used by RHEL. This makes it possible to build FIPS-compliant binaries without needing RHEL. RHEL 8.2 ships a FIPS-validated OpenSSL, but 8.5 is in review for FIPS validation.

This merge request introduces a FIPS pipeline for CNG images. Images tagged for FIPS have the -fips suffix. For example, the webservice container has the following tags:

• master
• master-ubi
• master-fips

• Current: UBI 9.6 Micro

Merge requests that can trigger Package and QA, can trigger a FIPS package and a Reference Architecture test pipeline. The base image used for the trigger is Ubuntu 20.04 FIPS:

1. Trigger e2e:test-on-omnibus-ee job, if not already triggered.
2. On the gitlab-omnibus-mirror child pipeline, manually trigger Trigger:package:fips.
3. When the package job is complete, manually trigger the RAT:FIPS job.

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