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The true history of Soviet spaceflight is predominantly the story of Soviet military space. Manned or scientific space missions could often only be justified as part of larger military projects. Less than 20% of Soviet launches were for 'national prestige' purposes (civilian manned flights, scientific and planetary).

The Soviet Union was a planned economy, and space projects were developed in co-ordination with Soviet five year plans. Long range military forces plans were made for a ten year period, and implemented in two five-year phases. The first such plan was approved in 1961. The second was approved in 1970, but the failure of the N1 launcher project and the poor reliability of first generation Soviet systems led to a drastically revised ten-year plan for second generation systems being approved in 1976. The final long-range space plan, for third generation systems, was approved in 1981 but again drastically revised in the face of the American 'Star Wars' programmer in 1985. This was subject to constant alteration under Gorbachev and finally was never implemented. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation conducted space operations at a reduced level basically using assets and systems that were 'in the pipeline' before the end of the Communist government.

Russian space historians variously refer to three or four generations of space systems, resulting in some confusion. The planning process resulted in a cycle where development of new space systems was authorized in one five-year plan, followed by operational use in the next five-year plan. This resulted in Soviet space systems falling into three generations before the fall of the Soviet Union. Prior to these three generations a few projects were begun on the initiative of the rocket and spacecraft Chief Designers, before the military fully accepted or understood the usefulness of space systems.

The theoretical and ideological basis for spaceflight in Russia - were established by Tsiolkovskiy. Between 1883 and 1932 he worked out the basic theoretical concepts of rocketry and space flight. His visions of man leaving the earth and colonizing space became a kind of space ideology that inspired and guided Soviet rocket engineers and space scientists. There was no real comparable ideological underpinning in the West.

Tsiolkovskiy's work led groups of enthusiasts to begin work on basic rocket technology. These young engineers - among them Korolev in Moscow, Glushko in Leningrad, and Tikhonravov - would become the chief designers who led the Soviet Union into space. Many of these talents were caught up in Stalinist purges in 1937-1938 and ended up in work camps in Siberia. Wartime necessity drove Stalin to bring the survivors back into 'sharashkas' - prison engineering design bureaus. Soviet military rocket research during World War II concentrated mainly on Jet-Assisted Take-off (JATO) units for combat aircraft and the RP-318, BI-1, and Malyutka rocket interceptors. Only toward the end of the war was work begun on long range rockets (Tikhonravov MK 4-stage rocket and Korolev's D-1 and D-2).

The huge German technical advances in rocketry during the war rendered this indigenous work obsolete. Stalin was determined to leapfrog the West by assimilating this new technology as quickly as possible. A decree of 13 March 1946 set up a number of research institutes to exploit the technology, and several thousand Germans were brought to Russia for this purpose. Young engineers were named to head the institutes, and more future chief space designers - Keldysh, Isayev, Chelomei, Reshetnev - began work on rocket technology. Keldysh pursued one of Stalin's pet projects - the Keldysh Bomber, an intercontinental rocket based on the German Saenger spaceplane design. This work eventually lead to the Buran - M-42 - M-44 and Burya intercontinental cruise missiles, but was a dead end as far as spaceflight was concerned. Similarly, tests were conducted with rocket-powered aircraft (LL, I-270, Samolyot 5, 346) but these did not lead to operational air or spacecraft.

Tikhonravov wrote a seminal paper on 15 March 1950 on the potential uses of artificial satellites. A decree of 26 May 1954 ordered preliminary studies of such systems. The technological basis was the N-3 project, which covered various engine and propulsion approaches. In August 1955 a unit was formed by Korolev to co-ordinate with Tikhonravov development of the first artificial satellite, for launch by the R-7 8K71 ICBM.

Sputnik-1's launch on October 4, 1957 caused a tremendous sensation throughout the world and marked the beginning of the space race. The casual plan of 1956 was accelerated, and Korolev was authorized to develop new upper stages for the R-7 that would allow launches of unmanned probes to the moon and planets.

Korolev was not only in competition with the Americans, but other Soviet Chief Designers who wanted a 'piece of the action' in the space race. Korolev's chief rival was Chelomei, a designer of naval cruise missiles. It was apparent that the ballistic missile was superior to the cruise missile as a weapon system at intercontinental ranges and also would allow the exploration and colonization of space. Chelomei hired Nikita Khrushchev's son on March 8, 1958. This gave Chelomei sudden and immediate access to the highest possible patron in the hierarchy. He was rewarded with his own design bureau, OKB-52, in 1959. In this period Khrushchev was pursuing a major cutback of the military and consolidation of the defense industry. As part of this the Myasishchev and Tsybin aeronautical design bureaus were closed and the staff ended up being included Chelomei's organization.

Chelomei's cruise missiles were designed for long-term storage in environmentally-controlled capsules. Chelomei saw that this technology could be applied to ballistic missiles and spacecraft as well. A whole family of unmanned spacecraft, dubbed Kosmoplans and Raketoplans, would be built using modular elements. The spacecraft would be launched by Chelomei's equally modular family of UR universal rockets, capable of both ICBM and space launch missions. The UR-200 would be used for launch of smaller earth orbital Kosmoplans, and the UR-500 Proton 8K82 would be used for launch of manned, lunar landing, and interplanetary Kosmoplan - Raketoplan designs.

In 1959, as Chelomei laid out these plans, he knew a tremendous struggle would be required to wrest any part of the space programmer from Korolev. Korolev was interested in military projects only so far as they provided financing for his dreams of space exploration. He jealously wished to keep all manned, lunar, and planetary space projects to himself. In a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Part in January 1960 he proposed an aggressive program for Communist conquest of space. He declared:

As payloads for this enormous rocket, Korolev proposed the following spacecraft be developed for launch in the period 1963 to 1965:

For his part, Korolev and the other chief designers would pledge to support this overall effort by the development of draft projects and fundamental research work to validate and mature the necessary technologies. They would place before the Central Committee in the third quarter of 1960 comprehensive plans for development of the new projects. It was requested that that the Central Committee authorize the design bureaus to undertake these draft projects, and that the Ministry of Finance be directed to allow the bureaus to use reserve funds to finance the work.

This letter was followed by a meeting with Khruschchev on the subject on 3 March 1960. Korolev believed it would be truly possible with backing from the very top to have a large rocket in the USSR in a very short span of time. Unfortunately at the meeting Korolev made a slip of the tongue he would always regret, admitting that his plan had not been agreed among all of the Chief Designers. This resulted in Khrushchev throwing the matter back for a consensus plan.

By 30 May 1960 Korolev was back with a plan that now included participation of his rivals, Chelomei and Yangel. The military, however, had not been fully consulted or reached any final conclusions as to its needs. The consolidated plan was as follows:

The final government decree 715-296 of 23 June 1960 'On the Production of Various Launch Vehicles, Satellites, Spacecraft for the Military Space Forces in 1960-1967', authorized draft project work to begin on this massive agenda.

Meanwhile the projects authorized in the 1950's were underway, maintaining the Soviet lead in the space race. In January 1960 Star City, the Cosmonaut Training Centre, was founded by the Soviet Air Force and Kamanin was made the head. The first cosmonaut candidates arrived in March 1960. Following unmanned flight tests of Vostok 1KP, Vostok 1K and Vostok 3KA configurations, Yuri Gagarin made the first manned space flight on 12 April 1961. Five further manned Vostok flights maintained the Soviet lead in the space race. In order to keep up with the Americans, Korolev developed and flew a multi-crew version of Vostok (the Voskhod 3KV) and a Vostok with an airlock to accomplish the first spacewalk (the Voskhod 3KD). Further Vostok and Voskhod flights (such as the Voskhod 3KV Tether experiment) were planned but cancelled in order to concentrate on the more capable Soyuz spacecraft.

In parallel with Vostok the more sophisticated Zenit-2 and Zenit-4 photo-reconnaissance variants of the spacecraft reached service. Zenit-2 flights began in December 1961; 13 were flown in two years. The system was accepted into the military service in 1964. Zenit-4, the high resolution version, followed in 1965.

The Soviet military realized that having the Chief Designers define space systems was a 'bottom up' approach that did not address the country's real needs. They were faced with an immense American build-up of ballistic missiles which they could not hope to match if resources were squandered on grandiose space projects. Therefore measures were taken to obtain control of the situation.

A July 1960 declaration listed the military systems to be developed in 1966 to 1970. Military research programs of 1962 to 1964 code-named Shchit (space systems), Osnova (space equipment), and Ediniy KIK (ground systems) defined the first generation of Soviet operational space systems, deployed in 1966-1975. First generation systems were often developed by Korolev, then spun off to other design bureaus for production. At the beginning of the 1960's an unwieldy total of thirty space systems were in development.

In the early 1960's Russian strategic nuclear forces on land, sea, and air were already in place. The military wished to integrate military space forces with these in a systematic manner as soon as possible. These requirements resulted in definition of an SKV - Space Military System. The SKV would exploit the global range of orbital systems; determine the precise location of mobile and fixed targets for strike by strategic forces, precisely hit such targets, and quickly and securely transmit targeting information.

A hallmark of the early 1960's was militarization of space under the shadow of Kennedy's policy of massive retaliation. Both the US and USSR deployed unmanned and developed manned systems to identify, track, and destroy the enemy's satellites. ABM systems could also be used to hit satellites in orbits up to 200 km. This process of militarization of space was only averted, in the Soviet view, by actions taken by Nixon in the 1970's (the SALT-I treaty, the ABM treaty, and secret understandings to stop development of anti-satellite systems).

The period 1966-1970 featured the first practical use of space systems of the first generation.

First generation satellites were very unreliable. One problem was unrealistic specifications, another a lack of proven space-worthy components. The first solution was redundant systems, and these were tried on an experimental basis in the Meteor, Strela, and Tsiklon satellites. Flight demonstrations proved use of better construction methods would allow guaranteed satellite lifetimes of two to three years. Meanwhile the operational situation reached a crisis point. The USA had faced the same problem, and developed a strong reliable component basis for spacecraft. This had increased individual American satellite lifetimes to 3 to 5 years and system operational lives to 5 to 7 years (through use of on-orbit reserve spacecraft). But in the Soviet Union, due to the urgency to deploy, there was no time to develop such a technical basis for first generation systems. Only in the 1970's were reliability problems solved through use of qualified standard components, standard means of documentation, and quality assurance.

While the reliability of first generation systems was poor, they still met the needs of the Rocket Forces and General Staff. Quick reaction (10 to 12 day) launch times were achieved, and the new systems allowed precise targeting of long range rockets and naval forces. The Korund space communications system provided reliable command and control of the strategic forces.

Military space operations began in 1961 with the 'Provisional Rocket-Engineering Auxiliary' VNIRS-61. This initially developed military operational plans for launch sites and command and control activities, including regularly scheduled maintenance operations. This first phase, which prepared the military to execute space operations and conduct trials of systems, was completed by 1965. The first military space operations plans were prepared for the Zenit reconnaissance satellite system in 1964 to 1965, and subsequently used by the General Staff in the operation of that system.

Monitoring- Characterization of Near-Earth Space: Two Energia spacecraft, adapted from the Zenit reconnaissance satellite, were launched in the 1970's to study high-energy cosmic rays. These were supplemented by the Lavochkin Prognoz series, launched in 1972 to 1976, for study of geomagnetic fields, radiation, and solar physics. They continued the work of the Elektron-A and Elektron-B spacecraft of 1964.

Systems tests and scientific experiments: From 1968 Nauka attached containers or free-flying sub-satellites were used on Zenit reconnaissance satellites to develop methods to study radiation belts; establish radiation standards; establish the characteristics of the earth-space interface; and develop new instruments. 23 autonomous sub-satellites conducted methodical research into geophysics, meteorology, and cosmic rays. The DS series of light satellites developed by Yangel also provided platforms for a wide range of technology equipment tests and space environment monitoring. They flew under the 'Cosmos' satellite program ('Cosmos' name was also used as the cover name for any military satellite or launch failure). This program was managed by the Third Directorate of the GURVO Rocket Forces, consisting of four sections of 36 officers and 5 civilians.

Although they represented only 20% of launches, national prestige projects (manned and planetary missions) represented 50% of the effort of the military, which was responsible for the launch facilities and operations. This was due to their scale and use of non-standard launch vehicles and spacecraft.

Mature first generation space systems provided targeting and communications support for the Soviet strategic forces. These systems were developed in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) and deployed in the Tenth Five Year Plan (1976-1980). However initial planning began in November 1966 when TsUKOS MO (Central Directorate of the Space Forces of the Ministry of Defense) formed the first permanent unit for military space operations with Col A I Udaltsov as its Chief. In the period 1966 to 1969 the unit prepared and put into operation formal technical procedures. These were issued in June 1969 in the manual, 'Organization, Maintenance, and Military Operation of Space Systems'.

Plans Epokha (1965), Koltso (1968), and Oblako (1970) formalized the military-political structures for space operations, and determined the optimal groupings of earth- and space-based forces in military operations. The theoretical plan Koltso (1966-1968) defined an organized method for scientific development of space forces and showed that they could be operated in fundamentally the same way as other arms of the military. In 1968 4 NII MO (Fourth Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense) formed Filial 4 for scientific research. In April 1970 two directorates were formed, one for Military Space Units Research and the other for Mathematical-Modelling Military Research. These consisted of five new science units, and 12 laboratories. They conducted ballistic calculations for the RVSN Rocket Forces and Space Forces and prepared the TTT and TTZ specifications for new projects.

A Defense Ministry directive of 6 November 1968 laid out the actions to be taken in the late 1960's and early 1970's for unit programming for military utilization (Plans Mars, Osnova, Orion). The objective was to integrate space forces into overall military planning, taking into account the most cost-effective use of resources. This included basic space research for military and national economy purposes.

Methodical operations planning was begun by Filial 4 NII MO from 1967, and was completed in 1970 with Plans Prognoz and Sirius Phase I. These established the development plans for the space forces in the period 1971-1980. These plans set the following objectives:

Sirius Phase I was the first space project based on recommendations of the Scientific-Technical Committee of the Rocket Forces, headed by General N N Alekseyev. This first project plan was include in the ninth Soviet Five Year Plan (1971-1975).

The Soviet military units responsible for space operations went through several reorganizations. From October 1964, the Third Directorate of the GURVO (Main Directorate of the Rocket Forces), was responsible for Baikonur and Plesetsk operations. From March 1970 GUKOS MO (Main Directorate of the Space Forces of the Military of Defense) was formed and took over this responsibility. It reported directly to the General Staff. GUKOS was able to wrest control of the MKRTs electronic surveillance system from the Russian Navy but ASAT and SPRN Early Warning Systems remained the responsibility of the PVO Air Defense Forces.

In 1971-1976 trials of all first generation systems were completed and the phase of implementation and full utilization of these systems began. Of the 30 systems authorized for draft project stage, only 14 systems entered service. Those eliminated included almost all of the elaborate manned military and space exploration designs of Korolev and Chelomei.

In 1970 to 1976 standard manuals and norms were developed for the operation of the space forces. Launch and tracking facilities became more standardized and steps were taken to make the space forces more resilient in combat. Measures taken included development of autonomously-operating satellites, orbiting of reserve satellites, and deployment of mobile reserve tracking stations. Systems were developed for operation in difficult conditions, including enemy jamming environments. Both ground stations and satellites were provided with the capability to maneuver whenever possible.

By the end of the 1970's space systems were in place that were integrated into the country's military doctrine and plans, fully supported Soviet strategic communications, and provided command and control of continental and oceanic military forces.

Development of the first nine systems of the first generation was completed in 1974-1975 and flight trials were conducted in the second half of the 1970's. The second group of first generation systems were developed in the second half of the 1970's and deployed in the first half of the 1980's. They provided crucial intelligence that helped maintain the USA-USSR balance of power.

First generation systems were designed for practical application of space technology by all parts of the state (military, economic, science, control, agricultural, international co-operation, etc.). These were a result of the following policy decisions:

National Prestige Projects

Launch Vehicles

The Ministry of Defense did manage to retire some old launch vehicles. 1974 saw the last launch from KRK Raduga using the Kosmos 63S1M booster. On 29 June 1976 the last Voskhod 11A57 booster was launched. As a result, in 1977 121 launches were made using only six types of launch vehicles and 16 types of spacecraft. Launch facilities at Kapustin Yar were limited to LC-5 and LC-53.

Lunokhod 1 / Ye-8-LS
Mature First Generation Soviet Space Systems
Credit: © Mark Wade

Second Generation Soviet Space Systems

Second generation space systems extended support of space assets beyond the strategic forces to tactical military units. In April 1972 50 TsNII KS MO (50th Central Scientific Research Institute for Space Systems of the Ministry of Defense) was decreed. It was empowered to co-ordinate all of the work of the various space research institutions (TsNIIMASH, NIITI, Agat, NII Khimash) on follow-on space systems. The objective was to draft a five year plan for satellites to be used in the 1985-1990 period. 50 TsNII KS MO was formed from staff and facilities of 4-NII MO. It was tasked to put together defense plans, draft TTT and TTZ specifications, and conduct trials of equipment. Research supported the RVSN Rocket Forces in their planning for 1971-1975. These included Plans Sirius Phase 2, Dal', Gamma, and Zamysel. The final result was two plans: "Program for Military Space Units for 1976 to 1985" and "Basis and Direction of Development of Space Units through 1990". These documents defined the Soviet Union's second generation space systems. The plans included:

Fwd view of Energia
Forward view of Energia launch vehicle in assembly hall at MIK
Credit: © Mark Wade

After evaluation by the Ministry of Defense, these plans were approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Ministers on 27 February 1976. They included the definition of new research programs in the 1976-1980 period, operational effectiveness studies, organizational studies, and determination of optimal orbits for various satellite constellations. This February decree was a watershed which laid out the systems that would be designed and deployed until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These plans embodied the response of the Soviet leadership to the technical debacles of the early 1970's - the loss of the moon race, the failure of the N1, the unreliability of first generation spacecraft. Development of the new space systems would use new research, quality assurance, and program management techniques. These would make maximum use of successful American 'best practices' and technology that had won the moon race.

The Soviet Unified Space System consisted of:

There was considerable controversy as the 'Young Turks' took on the conservatives. The controversy mirrored the 'star wars' arguments of the following decade in the United States - conventional space objectives versus exotic technologies and possibilities. Although preliminary research projects were begun, the weaponization of these concepts did not begin until the mid-1980's.

At the conclusion of the deployment of these systems, the Soviet Union finally achieved military space system parity with the United States. But there were serious delays. By the end of the 11th Five Year Plan (1981-1985), of 23 priority systems requirements, 21 were from one to three years behind schedule. The two that had been completed were finished one year behind schedule. Only 60% of the planned flight trials launches had been completed. In particular delays in development of the new Zenit launch vehicle impacted all the other programs, increasing their costs. Tselina-2 had to be initially launched aboard Proton boosters, and Yantar-4K aboard Soyuz-U.

Second generation Launch Vehicles

A completely new family of dedicated space launch vehicles, not derived from military missiles, would be developed to support the spacecraft. 50 TsNII-KS began research in 1973 on Plan Poisk - a new modular family of launch vehicles. These were in four classes: Light - 3 metric tons payload; Medium, 10-12 metric tons; Heavy, 30 - 35 metric tons; and Super-heavy. The objectives:

Strela-1
Strela-1 prototype. Later spacecraft in the series are believed to be similar in appearance.

Many concepts were studied. The Universal Modular Approach allowed modules to be thoroughly tested. Conclusions of the study:

On 3 November 1973 GUKOS set forth new design principles for the next generation of launch vehicles: These objectives were set out in the decree for development of future KRK (Space Rocket Complexes), "Basic directions in research in space units", dated 17 February 1976.

During these studies the launch vehicle engineering bureaus responded with designs meeting the needs of the military: the UR-500MK from Chelomei, and the RLA-120-RLA-135-RLA-150 family from Glushko. Glushko's emphasis was on the super-heavy vehicle to support a continued lunar base project.

But the VPK Military-Industrial Commission and the national leadership rejected the approach favored by the Ministry of Defense. Instead the instructions were to provide a precise Soviet equivalent to the American space shuttle system, notably in use of a Liquid Oxygen-Liquid Hydrogen core vehicle. The KRK principles were applied to this design. The resulting MKS launch vehicle consisted of the Buran, Energia, and Zenit-2 systems. But this system did not have the flexibility required by the Ministry of Defense. From this situation only the following military objectives could be salvaged:

The first resolution of the VPK Military Industrial Commission on the subject of a space shuttle was in December 1973: 'Preliminary work on reusable space systems'. By November 1974 the characteristics of Buran were defined by NPO Energia. Despite the negative experiences with the N1, the Ministry of Defense agreed to co-operate and develop MKS Buran, resulting in the final decree of 17 February 1976. The extensive flight test program to qualify the spaceplane would include the BOR-5 subscale version and Buran Analogue full-scale subsonic test vehicle. Competing spaceplane designs (MTKVA, LKS) were rejected.

Because of all the new technology, development of Zenit-Energia went very slowly. Since the Ministry of Defense�s requirements for new launch vehicles had not been met they had to rely on continued use of old classes of boosters. The existing Kosmos 11K65M, Tsyklon-3 and Proton 8K82K would be used for the light and heavy-class payloads.

Work on the Zenit launch complex began in 1978. The first pad was ready in December 1983 but due to delays in development of the first stage engines flight trails did not begin until 13 April 1985. In the spring of 1987 state commission that accepted the basic system for military use, but much work remained to be done. This included construction of a second launch complex at Baikonur, qualification of a third stage for geostationary payloads, and construction of a third launch complex at Plesetsk.

The same engine problems delayed test of the Energia-Buran vehicles. A comprehensive plan for use of Buran for military, scientific, and national economic purposes was approved on 11 July 1984, which by then was two years behind schedule. Buran itself was finally prepared for flight tests in 1986. This marked the end of a huge development effort using 200 experimental test stands, 34 full-scale test units, and 5 full-scale articles in over 6,500 separate qualification tests. The Polyus-Skif-DM experimental military payload was assembled for the first flight.

Second Generation Space Systems

The development of satellites taking advantage of the new design principles and technologies could not be delayed for development of second generation boosters. Therefore most space systems were to be developed in two phases: Phase 1 for launch using existing launch vehicles (Tsyklon-3, Soyuz 11A511U, or Proton 8K82K) and Phase 2 for launch by Zenit-2. Due to delays in development of the Zenit booster, very few of the Phase 2 systems reached flight stage before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

National Prestige Projects

Third Generation Soviet Space Systems

Third generation Soviet space systems constituted an integrated Multi-Element Space System, including the planned Multi-echelon Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Preparatory work for third generation systems was undertaken under the Tenth Five Year Plan (1976-1980), with full definition of the systems in the 11th Five Year Plan, (1981-1985). In 1985 the plans were drastically revised and a crash programmer was undertaken to meet the American Strategic Defense Initiative challenge during the 12th Five Year Plan (1986-1990). Third generations systems were to be fully on line by 1990. This plan was not achievable and the Soviet Union disintegrated before any third generations systems could be placed in service.

Research institute 50-TsNII-KS GUKOS conducted studies in 1976-1980 on the third generation of satellite systems. These would have a 10 to 15 year development and deployment cycle. Participating in the studies were the Academy of Sciences, scientific institutes, and industry. Among the resulting studies were those code-named Gorizont-K, Dal, Zamysel-95, and Klokot. Project Borba studied the operational strategic problems of military activity in space. Shturm-2 identified the military, scientific, and technological research and development required for third generation military space units. The final results of the studies were summarized in the reports 'Basic Direction of Military Space Unit Development to 1995' and 'Program for Military Space Units, 1981-1990'. Approval of these plans from the Central Committee and Soviet Ministers was issued on 2 June 1980. This covered the period through 1990 and included plans for use of the Almaz-T multimode reconnaissance system and Elektro geosynchronous meteorological satellite.

Further operational studies included the 16 volume OTT-70 which set forth system specifications and force descriptions. RK-75 set forth the order of battle for both space and rocket forces. At the end of 1980 the VPK Military Industrial Commission also ordered a strategic plan extending to 1995 and a plan for research to 2000.

These plans were drastically revised as a result of what the Soviet Union perceived as the remilitarization of space by the United States with the F-15 ASAT and Shuttle programs. At this time second generation Soviet space systems were supporting the military, but 25% of the new systems were behind schedule (Yantar-4K, Geo-IK, and Strela especially). The use of space for combat, especially plans for use of the Buran spaceplane, were not taken seriously by the Ministry of Defense. In April 1976 Ustinov had authorized work to start on military space combat systems, but by 1979 the development work was unfocussed.

The leadership at GUKOS (Main Directorate of the Space Forces) wanted to collect all of these diverse projects into a single organization. This Space Force would be equal to the RVSN Strategic Rocket Forces in status. This was opposed by RVSN, but on 10 November 1981 a decree made GUKOS responsible for all space forces and satellites. GUKOS was tasked with ensuring synergistic organization of satellite constellations; co-ordination of the ABM anti-ballistic missile forces and SPRN early warning satellites with the PVO Air Defense Force; co-ordination with the VVS Air Force on use of space reconnaissance data and cosmonaut training; and operation of the space tracking system.

Aryabhata
Credit: ISRC On 22 August 1980 the VPK Military Industrial Commission resolution ordered development of a space forces Five Year Plan for 1981 to 1985. In July-August 1981 the plan was reviewed. Objectives included:

This plan was submitted to a special session of the Ministry of Defense in August 1981. It envisioned development of 8 new space systems plus the Tsiklon-3 booster with a new upper stage. The integrated Global Space System would consist of multiple subsystems:

At the same time long-range plans for military space projects in the period 1985-1995 were approved.

Multi-echelon Anti-Ballistic Missile System

At the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's the United States began new research in the use of spacecraft for the destruction of military targets in and from space. In the late 1960's development began at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory of a space-based nuclear weapon-pumped laser. This was originally envisioned as a fearsome weapon, consisting of several dozen independently aimed lasing rods arranged around the bomb. When the bomb exploded, a large percentage of its force would be conducted down the lasing rods toward the targets at which they pointed (in the microsecond before the rods themselves vaporized).

At the same time the Air Force and NASA were studying reusable space shuttles. A single shuttle payload bay of such weapons had the potential of destroying the entire Soviet ICBM force - not just in launch phase but in a first strike, frying them right through the silo covers. One of the most heavily classified projects of the time, it still came to the attention of Soviet intelligence.

During this same period NASA was struggling to justify a post-Apollo space program. The Nixon administration decided that the USAF shuttle project would be dropped, and their requirements incorporated into the NASA design. One of these requirements was a mission involving a launch into polar orbit from Vandenberg Air Force base, release of unspecified payloads into orbit, and return to Vandenberg after a single orbit of the Earth. This requirement forced NASA to drop their preferred straight-wing design for a heavier double-delta wing that had the necessary cross range. The Soviet leadership saw their worst fears confirmed. This was a modern version of the first-strike multiple-warhead UR-500 and N1 super heavy rockets which they had developed but then abandoned in the early 1960's.

America was also beginning work on other directed energy approaches that did not require use of nuclear detonations. In 1968, a gas dynamic laser was reviewed in a study to see if it would be a viable as a satellite anti-missile system. In 1971, the Aerospace Corporation developed a prototype infrared fluorine-hydrogen laser. By 1975, Lockheed put together the first concept of a satellite armed with a laser and a deployable mirror.

Fram Parallel work began in the Soviet Union in the same period. One direction was advocated by the Ministry of Radio Industry, which had managed the development of the Soviet ABM system since the late 1950's. Another approach was the use of neutral particle beam weapons, advocated by Gersh Budker at a secret institute in Novosibirsk.

During the late 1960's and early 1970's Soviet research institutes, design bureaus, the Academy of Sciences, and the General Staff conducted numerous discussions and unofficial studies. Among these plans were the use of the Korolev MKBS space station as a platform for a neutral particle beam weapon and logistical support of a constellation of military interceptor vehicles. The MKBS approach was abandoned when the N1 launch vehicle was cancelled.

An April 1976 decree began definitive project work on 'Star Wars' technology within the Soviet Union. To develop space weapons the two-phase Fon program was undertaken. Fon-1 encompassed fundamental research and draft project work on a variety of technologies - laser weapons, neutral particle beams, electro-magnetic rail guns, new orbital interceptor missiles, new conventional and nuclear warhead technologies, new anti-ballistic missiles, and space platforms to support these weapons. Fon-2 would take the technologies selected as a result of Fon-1 and conduct flight trials of prototype systems. Fielding of operational space combat units would only come thereafter.

The MOP Ministry of Defense Production set up a new Eighth Main Directorate to manage the work of the various institutes and bureaus. P S Pleshakov of the Ministry of Radio Industry oversaw the work of the design bureaus. In the 1970's and 1980's ambitious and complex research was conducted on space vehicles capable of destroying rockets in flight, airborne vehicles in the atmosphere, vessels at sea, and targets on land. These studies assessed both the feasibility and affordability of such spacecraft.

Early results were not encouraging. NPO Kometa (A I Savin), manufacturer of the existing IS-A anti-satellite system, was asked to study the feasibility of a conventional system to destroy 10,000 ballistic re-entry vehicles and cruise missiles within 5 to 25 minutes with an effectiveness of 99.8%. The study concluded that such a system was not practical technically or economically.

Directed energy weapons might have a better chance of engaging many targets in a surprise attack, but testing of charged practical beam technology resulted in many technical problems that would take a long time to solve. (The 1976 conclusion of the US Defense Intelligence Agency that such work had reached an advanced stage at an immense facility at Semipalatinsk was shown to be incorrect after the fall of the Soviet Union).

Laser technology was also pursued but also faced many technical and cost problems in achieving high energies. The principle center for laser research was TsKB Luch, headed by Nikolai Ustinov, son of the Soviet Defense Minister. In the late 1970's this was reorganized into NPO Astrofizika. Astrofizika designed lasers for both tactical and strategic use and was receiving 1% of the Soviet defense budget during this period. A free electron laser was tested at Storozhevaya, and a 1 MW gas laser at Troitsk.

OKB Vympel was the systems integrator for ground-based laser systems. They built the major Terra-3 laser testing center at Sary Shagan, which was eventually equipped with Astrofizika high power red ruby and carbon dioxide lasers. But the energies were not sufficient for anti-ballistic missile use. The first applications would be limited to anti-satellite operations, and then primarily to blind optical sensors.

Ekran
Credit: © Mark Wade Other institutes involved in research were NIITP (Research Institute for Thermal Processes) which handled high energy gas dynamic lasers, and the Scientific Institute for Radio Device Production, which worked on plasma weapons.

Meanwhile Livermore work on the nuclear-pumped laser had evolved into a space-based x-ray laser weapon which would destroy ICBM's during boost phase, after they had cleared the atmosphere. But in 1977 President Carter cancelled further development work on this weapon. The threat seemed to recede and by the early 1980's Fon-1 work had focused on the more achievable goal of improved interception and destruction of enemy satellites.

But in June 1982 America announced its intentions to test a new SRAM-Altair ASAT from an F-15 fighter. Later that year Edward Teller dazzled Ronald Reagan with tales of desk-sized x-ray lasers that could be deployed within four years and create an invulnerable defense shield around the United States. Work on the x-ray laser was renewed with vigor as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The program quickly expanded to include research on a broad range of directed energy and rocket interceptor weapons.

Reagan's 'Star Wars speech' on 23 March 1983 seemed to indicate a much earlier deployment than the Soviets had previously thought. Plans were made in America for deployment of the existing Vought MNV warhead developed for the F-15 ASAT. 40 to 45 of these homing vehicles, weighting 2.0 to 2.5 metric tons each, would be housed in orbital platforms in 65-degree inclination, 550 km orbits. Test and deployment of the constellation was to begin in five to seven years. Later studies indicated 30 to 40 such platforms would be deployed with 1350-1800 interceptors.

The Soviet response was immediate. Yuri Andropov ordered additional funding and implementation of Fon-2. At the same time Soviet diplomatic initiatives were undertaken. A proposal was made to the United States to ban all space-based weapons. Andropov declared a unilateral moratorium on testing of the improved IS-MU ASAT. As a 'warning shot' the Terra-3 complex was used to track the STS-41-G space shuttle Challenger with a low power laser on 10 October 1984. This caused malfunction of on-board equipment and temporary blinding of the crew, leading to a US diplomatic protest.

Premier Andropov brought the necessary new discipline and enthusiasm to begin development of Soviet counterpart systems. In response to reports that the US intended to have SDI operational in 10 to 15 years, Minister of Defense Ustinov and VPK Chief Smirnov ordered an urgent revamping of the 11th Five Year Plan (1981-1985). The objective was deployment of space combat systems at the earliest possible date. Total space program expenditures to cover these systems were to be increased 35% from the 11th to 12th Five Year Plans (1986-1990) and 50% from the 12th to 13th Five Year Plans (1991-1995).

However the top-level managers that ran the Soviet space program were fading into history. Afanasyev left MOM (Ministry of General Machine-Building) in 1983. When Ustinov died in December 1984 the Soviet space program lost its biggest backer. He had been the impetus behind development of Buran and the electro-optical reconnaissance systems. He was the leading proponent of a vigorous Soviet response to Star Wars.

The Baikonur and Plesetsk launch centers were reorganized in 1984, with the Baikonur 5 NIIP MO incorporating the 50 TsNII KS research institute, including a new 8th Directorate for operation of the Buran shuttle and BKS Combat Shock Space System - alternative space weapons. The living facilities at the Golistsino-2 command and control center were also upgraded.

Tsikada 50 TsNII-KS was first asked to evaluate SDI in 1983. By 1985 the Soviet Ministers were asking for concrete proposals. A study group headed by Ye P Velikhov was formed from the Academy of Sciences and military institutes. Subpanels evaluated multi-layered systems using lasers, guns, and electrodynamic weapons. The capability of the US Shuttle and Soviet Buran to deploy such systems was studied.

The final conclusion was that new, fully reusable, more economical launch vehicles would be required to support the enormous launch rate required for SDI. Concurrent with this studies were made of ecologically clean, high power rocket engines needed to power a new generation of launch vehicles. Lox-Kerosene or Lox-LH2 propellants would be used by a modular family of launch vehicles with payload capabilities of 5 metric tons, 10-12 metric tons, 20-30 metric tons, 40-50 metric tons, and 80-100 metric tons. A common engine would be used in the first stage of all of these designs, which would be recoverable and reusable.

Aircraft-space systems with horizontal takeoff and landing would achieve a 30% reduction in system weight compared to conventional vertical takeoff. Use of nuclear energy was also considered under project MG-19, but development of such a system did not seem possible in the short term.

Analysis of the shuttle indicated that the design was a 'clunker' - it wasted 70 metric tons of orbiter mass on every flight to deliver 30 metric tons of payload. The Chelnoka study evaluated maneuvering aerodynamic-orbital dynamic systems to attack enemy satellites. Buran did not seem suited to this but could be used as a laboratory to develop new space technology. There was a need to test systems in orbit, and the Salyut and Mir space stations would allow this. Technology testing aboard these existing platforms would lead to a new generation of space systems by the turn of the century. These reparable and upgradeable space platforms that would be tended by Buran shuttles.

Concurrent with these urgent moves the Soviets began a diplomatic counter-offensive to kill the American SDI programmer through less-expensive means. This had been launched in earnest at a conference in Vienna on 9-25 August 1982. A series of UN Resolutions in August 1981 (36th UN General Assembly), 1982 (38th General Assembly), and the 12 December 1984 (39th General Assembly) all condemned and attempted to prevent the militarization of space. These resolutions were entirely in response to the initiatives of the Carter and Reagan administrations. The hostile intentions of the Americans were also evidenced by the 1982 NATO First Strike Policy, which went back to McNamara.

On 10 March 1985 Gorbachev came to power and on 12 March he asked for Geneva talks on nuclear and space forces. Nevertheless in May 1985 the US had formed the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to develop a multi-echelon ABM system. In September 1985 the US intercepted the SolWind satellite at an altitude of 450 km using an F-15-launched ASAT with an infrared seeker. The USSR conducted ASAT research as well, but had never engaged in a massive 'star wars' program on the scale of the American effort. In the Soviet view the concept of SDI was flawed - the necessary technology was an illusion. But the threat was real, and it was determined that even deployment of a flawed American system would upset the strategic balance.

America rushed the second generation ASAT into development. On 19-21 November 1985 Gorbachev and Reagan conducted summit talks in Geneva. The diplomatic efforts were having the desired effect - in December 1985 the US Congress stopped further ASAT tests as long as the Soviet Union did the same.

TKS Manned Ferry
TKS manned space station ferry.
Credit: © Mark Wade In parallel with diplomacy planning went ahead on deployment of a Soviet counterpart to SDI. At the end of 1984 it had been clear that the Soviet Union could not delay deploying space combat systems. The Ministry of Defense was to put together a plan by mid-1985 for integration into the 12th Five Year Plan (1986-1990). Revised military planning for 1986-1995 was undertaken. NPO Energia was given the leading role in preparing the plan, together with research institutes led by 50 TsNII-KS.

The Ministry of Defense determined to proceed with a response to America's SDI at a meeting on 8 November 1985. The financial plan was ready on 7 December 1985. The concept was for a Multiple-Element ABM system costing 30.7 billion rubles in 1986-1990. A government commission headed by Academy of Sciences Vice President Ye P Velikhov reviewed the plan on 11 December 1985. It was then presented to the VPK Military-Industrial Commission in January 1986. The plan included:

Tests of systems would be conducted in two phases: from 1986 to 1990, from 1991 to 1995, and then deployment completion by 2000. Key review points were incorporated into each phase. The VPK approved the plan as presented. TTZ specification documents for the new systems were to be issued by the first quarter of 1987.

The project was finalized in a decree of 7 February 1986 Under this decree GUKOS was reorganized as the Chief Directorate for Space Forces (UNKS). The decree put UNKS in control of all space units, and placed it on an equal footing with the other branches of the armed forces. On 25 February 1986 the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held. In considering the 12th Five Year Plan, there was much denunciation of American actions. The peace-loving Soviet Union had fought constantly against the arms race, and what was the American answer? Star Wars!

Development of the planned conventional third generation space systems was delayed after 1985 by priority being given to Soviet SDI systems. Therefore flight trials of third generation satellites, planned for the 1986-1989 period were delayed to 1990 or beyond. The 12th Five Year Plan (1986-1990) doubled spending on space and priority was given to combat systems. The state budget for scientific research and experimental design went from 9% of the total in 1985 to 9% in 1989. Buran and Zenit flight test schedules were accelerated while work on light and heavy class launchers came to a stop.

The explosions of the shuttle Challenger on 28 January 1986, a Titan 34D booster on 18 April 1986, and a Delta rocket on 3 May 1986 brought the US space program to a halt. The shuttle was delayed by 2 years and 8 months, and its use for commercial launches was abandoned in favor of existing expendable vehicles. NASA continued to promote commercial use of space, which featured prominently in its 25 year space plan published in January 1988.

UNKS had barely been formed when a 'negative' political atmosphere developed in the Soviet Union. Chernobyl exploded on 26 April 1986, followed by the declaration of the new policy of Perestroika in January 1987.

The Gorbachev-Reagan meeting at Geneva in October 1986 was promising, but at Reykjavik on 12 October 1986 Reagan reused to scrap SDI. In response the Soviets decided to halt their ASAT and ABM test moratorium, develop new nuclear weapons, space-based combat systems, regenerative lasers, and nuclear laser pumping devices.

Within the 12th Five Year Plan the Ministry of General Machine-Building (MOM) took the initiative in forcing the start of trials of Buran and completion of new concepts for third generation military space systems. A crash program had been initiated to test in space a range of laser and rocket interceptor prototypes on the massive Polyus test bed, to be launched on the first test of the Energia launch vehicle. An exposition for the Soviet leadership of impressive models and drawings of existing systems and proposed third generation systems was prepared at Baikonur in 1986. Gorbachev finally visited the cosmodrome on 11-13 May 1987. He reviewed the exposition, then proceeded to observe satellites in preparation at the Proton MIK-KA on the left flank of the cosmodrome. He also viewed the launch preparations for the Buran, Energia, and Polyus Skif-DM systems. The exposition did not have the desired effect and Polyus failed to achieve orbit in the first launch of the Energia booster just two days later.

Progress
View of the original Progress spacecraft, as displayed in Moscow in 1981.
Credit: © Mark Wade As platforms for operational weapons NPO Energia designed a USB Universal Service Block, based on the Salyut DOS-7K space station. The USB was equipped with common service systems and rocket engines. In comparison to the DOS the USB had much larger propellant tanks to allow substantial orbital maneuvering. The USB would be equipped with either a laser payload or a weapons bay consisting of ten miniature rocket homing vehicles. The Proton launch vehicle would be used to launch a 20 metric ton version of the USB for experimental flight tests. Operational 30 metric ton vehicles would be delivered to orbit by the Buran space shuttle. Buran would also bring crews for on-orbit servicing of the USB. For this purpose the USB had a life support capability of two crew for seven days.

The mass of the military payload depended on the amount of propellant loaded. The laser payload was heavy, with a resulting lower fuel fraction, and was limited to use against low earth orbit targets. The USB with the rocket homing vehicles had more propellant and could be used for attack of geostationary orbit targets.

A competing design by Chelomei used his TKS as a starting point. The Spektr - Original design was to be armed with Oktava interceptor rockets built by NPO Kometa. It had Lira sensors to identify and Buton sensors to track ballistic missile re-entry vehicles. Pion-K sensors would discriminate decoys from true weapons. A prototype of the Spektr would be docked with the Mir space station for systems tests.

To co-ordinate the actions of the multiple space combat units, NPO Energia proposed a KS space station. This would consist of a core built of targeting and base modules based on the USB, a command module based on the TKS, and a Zarya ballistic shuttle for crew rotation. Docked to the core would be military free-flying autonomous modules which would dispense nuclear warheads in re-entry vehicles of both ballistic and gliding types. The structure and various systems of these wingless autonomous modules would be based on the Buran space shuttle. Prototypes would be built from the various developmental Buran airframes. On command the military modules would separate from station and maneuver extensively before positioning themselves for attack of enemy targets on the ground or in space. On special command from the national authorities the enemy targets would be engaged with nuclear weapons.

For interception of enemy ICBM's during boost phase NPO Energia developed a space based rocket interceptor (RP) similar to American 'Brilliant Pebble' systems. This had a mass of only 10 kg and was powered by small but high energy rocket engines that gave the vehicle the same characteristic velocity as boosters that put payloads into orbit. The miniature vehicles used advanced technology and new scientific solutions. Non-traditional non-cryogenic propellants powered the engines. High strength materials were used for the propellant tanks.

Meteor-2 In April 1987 Secretary of State Shultz went to Moscow to discuss reductions in offensive strategic forces. On 8 December 1987 the US and USSR signed a treaty to eliminate short and medium range nuclear forces.

UNKS was internally reorganized, with the three main KIK Control and Tracking Centers (Yevpatoriya, Yeniseisk, Ula-Ude) designated Central Command Control and Tracking Centers. Five separate trials centers were established (4 at Baikonur and 1 at Plesetsk). Under project 'Rokot' primary and reserve Command Points were established at Golitsino-2 and Znamenka in Tambovsk Oblast. By the end of 1988 the reorganization was completed.

New political reforms were introduced on 1 July 1988 at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These included decisions on a peace platform, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and rapprochement with the USA. The American reply came within weeks. In October 1988 a revised three-phase SDI program was announced. Phase 1 would involve kinetic kill vehicles ('Brilliant Pebbles'), geosynchronous tracking satellites, and suborbital systems to observe ICBM trajectories. It was to be completed by the year 2000 at a cost of $100 billion. Phase 2 involved space-based platforms with hundreds of kinetic interceptor weapons. Exotic lasers and beam weapons had been relegated to a murky Phase 3.

From 1984 to 1989 $ 25.15 billion was spent on the American SDI, with military space expenditures exceeding those of NASA by 100% in 1988. Funding was reduced after 1988 as the technical difficulty and cost of actually fielding a system was realized. In 1988 only $3.9 billion in funds were received versus $ 5.7 billion requested.

Although in May 1989 work began on 'Phase Zero' of SDI, the US was finding its SDI to be neither technically or economically practical. Even with intercept ranges of 3000 to 5000 km thousands of interceptors would be required. The more modest Brilliant Pebbles system did not come close to meeting the original stated requirements. Soviet studies reached the same conclusion - space was suited for command and control of military forces, but not as an arena for combat.

To support launch of anticipated Soviet anti-ballistic missile forces the MOM Ministry of Medium Machine-Building pushed development of the super-heavy Buran, Buran-T, and Vulkan boosters without proper cause. Needed light and middle class boosters were delayed. The Soviet SDI program, which would have been the only source for payloads for these large boosters, was not financially feasible. This emphasis on these large systems also delayed work on third generation launch systems, which had begun in the 11th Five Year Plan (1981-1985).

1989 was the peak year for Soviet space, with 20% of the state scientific research budget devoted to space technology. In that year the civilian space program of the USA was $29.6 billion versus 6.9 billion rubles in the USSR. The American military space effort was costing $22.8 billion versus 3.9 billion rubles in the USSR, almost 6 times as much. Space economic and scientific programs were budgeted at $ 3 billion in the US versus 1.7 billion in the USSR. Reusable space systems cost $ 3.8 billion in the US versus 1.3 billion rubles in the USSR.

Partly due to the cost of trying to match the American Star Wars program, the Soviet Union disintegrated. Ironically, underground nuclear tests of the x-ray laser in Nevada showed that the concept would not work. Other parts of the colossal Strategic Defense Initiative ran into similar technical and cost barriers.

Soyuz T
Credit: © Mark Wade In 1992, as directed by the new Russian state's military and political leadership, all work on SDI projects was discontinued. The Spektr module was converted into a civilian platform. Its completion and docking with Mir was partially funded by the United States. The Buran shuttle, Mir-2 station, the space combat units - all were cancelled.

The Soviet balance sheet showed that conventional space systems had provided real benefits. Space amounted to 1.5% of the Soviet state budget. It was estimated that use of military satellites increased the effectiveness of military forces by 50% to 100%. In the 30 years since Sputnik the Soviet Union had spent 5.9 billion rubles on civilian space projects, with an estimated economic benefit of 12.6 billion rubles. The Moskva and Ekran television systems reached 93% of the USSR, with an economic benefit of 540 million rubles in 1988. Meteor-2 weather satellites were estimated to have an economic benefit of 500 to 700 million rubles per year. In 1989 it was anticipated that by the year 2000 commercial manufacture of medical and other materials in orbit would reach 20 billion rubles. The Tsikada system provided navigation to 4,500 ships while the Nadezhda COSPAS-SARSAT system had assisted in the saving of over 2,000 lives.

In developing Buran, 100 new materials, 24 new technical processes, 130 novel types of equipment, and 60 novel material types were developed with civilian applications. While the shuttle continued in use in America, in the Soviet Union it was considered part of the answer to SDI, and more a system for the 21st Century.

The US and USSR had achieved a balance of forces in the late 1970's and early 1980's, but then US military circled insisted on development of SDI. But in the Soviet analysis the USSR could have easily prevailed over any ABM system by using from 50% to 100% more missiles than the US.

Third Generation Launch Systems

The aborted third generation systems would finally have replaced the remaining ICBM-derived boosters (Kosmos, Tsiklon, Soyuz, Proton). They would use Lox-Kerosene or Lox-LH2 non-toxic, environmentally 'friendly' propellants to power a modular family of launch vehicles with payload capabilities of from 5 to 100 metric tons to orbit. Three common engines would be used in the all of the stages of all of these designs. It was intended that the lower stages would be evolved into recoverable and reusable versions after initial development. These launch vehicles were:

Manned systems: Buran had the same characteristics as the US Shuttle, and the same disadvantages - low economy, and mainly designed by construction bureaus for scientific and technical development and human space travel. Therefore design work continued on smaller spaceplanes as a replacement for the Soyuz manned ferry. Numerous trade studies of Russian Spaceplanes in the early 1980's (Bizan, System 49, System 49-M, OK-M, OK-M1, OK-M2) would finally result in the optimized MAKS design. This was approved for full development in 1988.

Gorizont Super heavy lift systems: To support launch of anticipated Soviet anti-ballistic missile forces the MOM in the late 1980's pushed development of the super-heavy Buran, Buran-T, and Vulkan boosters. These would have come on-line in the mid-1990's.

Single stage to orbit: In response to US technology initiatives, work on a Soviet counterpart to the American X-30 National Aerospaceplane was started in 1988. Following evaluation of various competing proposals (VKS, Yakovlev MVKS) the Tu-2000 scramjet vehicle was selected for development.

Third Generation Conventional Systems

Continuous Observation Operational Space System

The long term objective of the Soviet Union was to match the capabilities of the American KH-11 digital imaging satellite. The characteristics of this satellite were well known since spy William Kampiles provided the operating manual to the Russians in 1978. Soviet attempts to develop such a system were thwarted by an inadequate technical base. The first attempt was the TGR television satellite of the 1960's. This was succeeded by the Yantar-6KS, cancelled in May 1977 when the draft project indicated that the weight had grown beyond the payload capabilities of the Soyuz booster. A less-capable spacecraft based on the Yantar-4K bus was designed. The first phase spacecraft, the Yantar-4KS1, would begin flight trials in 1979, with the more capable Yantar-4KS2, launched by Zenit, to begin flight trials in 1983.

Development was slow because of the state of Soviet digital electronics technology. Yantar-4KS1 flight trials did not begin until the end of 1982. It proved impossible for the Yantar-4KS2 to match the performance of the KH-11. Therefore a 'clean sheet of paper' approach was taken.

Ustinov consolidated all optical reconnaissance work at TsSKB in 1981-1983, cutting across six ministries (the Ministries of Defense, Medium Machine Building (nuclear weapons), General Machine Building (rocketry), Electronics Industry, Radio Industry, Industry of Communications Means).

Studies were begun in 1980 and in June 1983 a decree was issued for a constellation of new-design third generation electro-optical military reconnaissance satellites. In July 1983 Kozlov was made Chief and General Constructor of the enlarged TsSKB Central Special Design Bureau. Under his leadership a multi-element reconnaissance satellite system was to be developed in 1981-1990 and deployed by 2000. These would be orbited in two groups of ten satellites at varying altitudes. This swarm would provide almost complete coverage of the earth's surface at a range of photographic resolutions.

Competitive designs of the imaging satellite were undertaken by NPO Lavochkin and Kozlov's TsSKB using common universal optic systems. Flight trials were to begin by 1986-1987. The Continuous Observation Operational Space System included a SLAR-equipped radar satellite by NPO Vega, with flight trials set for 1992. The launch vehicle for the third generation satellites was to be the Proton since Zenit did not have the necessary lift and Energia development was delayed. The data would be transmitted to the ground by GKKRS relay satellites.

Work on a new optics system had already begun in 1977 at Lavochkin. Development of the optics was a very difficult task headed by A N Veikozhon at the Leningrad Optical Mechanism Enterprise.

By the beginning of 1989 it became clear that this schedule could not be held. TsSKB had a lot of work on Buran and its associated scientific payloads. The mid-1980's put huge demands on the spacecraft design bureaus. They were attempting to test and put into production third generation systems while at the same time responding to government 'star wars' crash programs. The common telescope for the new generation satellites had weight problems, delaying the start of flight trials.

Gamma A January 1989 government resolution set 1991 as the date for the start of flight trials. But this was followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the attendant financial crisis. Trials were again delayed to 1996-1997. TsSKB finally dropped out of the competition and turned to continued production of the proven Yantar-4KS1 system.

A single example of the new Lavochkin satellite, the Arkon-1, was finally launched in 1997 into an unusually high orbit for a photo-reconnaissance satellite. This evidently was to take full advantage of the single satellite available, even at the sacrifice of ground resolution.

As a back-up improvements were made throughout the 1980's to the Yantar-4K, providing both high resolution and survey variants. The first flight trials of this new series of 4K's was to begin in 1989, but the satellites were not ready. Finally the work was abandoned.

Naval targeting satellites of the third generation had flight trials scheduled for 1990 in the 1984 plan. This was seriously delayed.

SGKRN System of Global Space Radio Observation

The Tselina-3 third generation ELINT was developed in parallel with Tselina-2. Work began in the 1970's, with research on a variety of new systems. Experimental instruments were flight-tested aboard Tselina-D missions. Two flight tests in 1986-1987 proved the effectiveness of the technical solutions. In 1985 the technical project for an operation system was begun. High orbit tests in 1988 showed the system would have to be deployed in two systems: a constellation of satellites in orbits of 800 to 2000 km altitude; and a Space System for Radio Relay and Combat, consisting of 1 to 2 satellites in geosynchronous orbit. The third generation satellites were designed by NPO Palma of Minradiopribor, with KB Yuzhnoye providing the satellite bus. The geosynchronous satellites, developed from the Luch relay satellites, were by NPO PM MOM. Flight trials of specialized relay payloads for use with the ELINT satellites of the VMF and DOS were tested during two launches in 1989.

YeSSS-3 Communications System

The third generation satellites of the YeSSS-3 communications system were developed by NPO PM. The two phase project would develop an improved version of the Raduga satellite, followed by a completely new design high elliptical orbit satellite to replace Molniya. These satellites would provide real-time operational and technical communications for the command units of the VVS Air Force and Soviet Navy, aboard aircraft, surface ships, and cruisers. The satellites would be equipped with millimeter band multibeam antennae and a greater capability for signal processing aboard the spacecraft. Capacity and survivability would be increased by doubling the number of spacecraft in each constellation.

Work on the third generation high elliptical orbit satellite was completed and the system was accepted into the military in 1987 as the Molniya-1T as part of the RVSN command and control system. The Modernized Ekran-M and Stuk-2 satellites completed flight trials at the same period.

For civilian communications modernized geosynchronous satellites were developed. The Ekspress was to replace Gorizont, and the Gals direct-broadcast satellite was introduced.

The Strela-3 had replaced both earlier models of the series for store-dump communications from the mid-1980's. Commercial versions Gonets-D1 and Gonets were launched but were not successful in attracting investors.

Geo-IK YeKNS Unified Space Navigation System

The modern GLONASS-Uragan system had entered operation during the late 1980's. A total of 22 spacecraft were placed in the constellation by the end of 1987, and 31 by the end of 1989.

Planeta Meteorological System

The system consisted of Meteor-3 sun synchronous satellites complemented by the geostationary Elektro satellites. Work began with a December 1972 resolution of the VPK Military Industrial Commission calling for development of a third generation Meteor satellite to start the following year. The draft project for the Planeta-S was completed in 1979, followed by the detailed design in May 1980. However it was not until 1981 that a resolution called for the Planeta-S unified meteorological system, and development of the system was only fully funded in June 1983. This system was developed at VNIIEM MEP by N Sheremtyevskiy and Yu V Trifonov. The draft project was completed in 1984 by VNIIEM Filial Istriisk under V I Adasko. Tests of some new equipment aboard Meteor-2 flights began at the end of 1984. Flight test of the complete spacecraft from Plesetsk did not start until 1990. Elektro development also ran into enormous obstacles in the period 1983-1987, with a mock-up not begin completed until 1989. Only by then were drawings for a flight article completed.

Support Systems

Development of a Taifun-3 third generation radar calibration - ASAT target spacecraft, derived from the Taifun-2, went well. The target was also used to exercise the A-135 ABM complex of the PVO and provided a system of wide-spectrum signal impulses. KB Yuzhnoye launched the first spacecraft of the type from Plesetsk in 1988. The satellite was launched by the Tsyklon 3 launch vehicle and released 36 Romb subsatellites.

Manned Program

The Mir-2 space station was to have utilized the capabilities of the Buran orbiter and Zarya and Progress M2 resupply spacecraft. After the decision for the crash 'star wars' programmer the primary mission of the station became that of a weapons test platform. This involved competitive proposals from Chelomei Mir-2 KB Salyut and Energia (Mir-2). It would undergo many changes over the years, with only one thing remaining constant: the starting point was always the DOS-8 base block space station core module, built as a back-up to Mir's DOS-7. Eventually Mir-2 would be merged with the International Space Station, and DOS-8 was finally launched as the ISS Zvezda Module of the ISS International Space Station. The planned Mir-Buran docking module entered service on joint American-Russian missions as the Mir-Shuttle Docking Module. A variant of the TKS was purchased by the Americans and, as the ISS Zarya, became the first part of the ISS orbited.

Scientific Satellites

Russian Federation Space Systems

The 13th and last Five Year Plan (1991-1995) saw vast changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The space forces had been reorganized in November 1988, but despite collapse of salary and budget deliveries work under the 12th Five Year Plan was completed. Most noticeably flight trials of Tselina-2 were completed and the system was accepted into the military. Flight trials of Strela-3, Molniya-1T, and Meteor-3 were conducted. Research with Resurs-F2 resources satellite and the Taifun-3 target complex went ahead, together with deployment of 40 new control systems.

Although ground tests and flight development of third generation systems had begun, there was no capital to meet the schedule established for the 1991-2000 period. Plans for countering SDI had to be abandoned. KIK Tracking stations no longer on Russian territory were abandoned, and to compensate three new tracking stations were built at Eysk, Maloyaroslavets, and Barnaul. With the break-up of the Soviet Union 75% to 90% of the space industry remained in Russia, but some unique capabilities, especially the Proton launch site, were lost.

Not all missions planned could be accomplished, and new priorities included attempts to commercialize space technology. Under the Konversiya concept space industrial facilities were to be converted to civilian use. Attempts were also made to market Soviet space technology internationally.

This was manifested as early as the launch of the Kristall module to Mir on 31 August 1990. The 19.5 metric ton module carried 7 metric tons of materials processing payload and the APAS-89 docking system for use with the US space shuttle. Collaboration with the United States on the ISS International Space Station also pumped funds into Mir. Meteor-TOMS was financed by Germany. In 1990 the Chinese head of state visited Baikonur, leading to space co-operation contracts from China. On 25 February 1992 the RKA Russian Space Agency was founded as a counterpart to the US NASA Agency. Staff involved with civilian space projects were transferred to the new organization. On 7 November 1992 the UNKS was replaced by the UK-VKS - Directorate for Command of the Military Space Forces.

The national space plan in 1992 was as follows:

Yantar E1
Credit: © Carsten Wiedemann Continuing budget declines met that Phase 2 of the plan could not be completed.

The Russian space plan identified nearly twenty new satellite communications systems. Networks receiving federal support in addition to commercial financing included Arkos, Ekspress-M, Gals, Gonets, Mayak, Signal, and Yamal. Systems which had to secure complete commercial backing were Bankir, Ekspress, Gals, Gelikon, Globsat, Kondor, Koskon, Kuryer, Nord, Sokol, SPS-Sputnik, and Zerkalo. Of all of these only Ekspress, Mayak, Gals, and Bankir (as Kupon would reach orbit by 2001.

During 1993-1994, 27 launches involving 47 communications satellites were undertaken, or 29% of all Russian space missions. Despite one launch failure, 27 low earth orbit, 7 highly elliptical, and 12 geosynchronous spacecraft were successfully deployed. These numbers represented about half of the operational network (an acceptable 2-year turnover). But some specific constellations became increasingly populated with spacecraft operating beyond their design lifetimes. This situation was especially apparent in geosynchronous orbit. As the 1990's continued ex-Soviet communications satellite constellations would continue to degrade.

In 1996 a concept for national space policy of Russia was issued in a decree. This covered the period to 2005. 4 October was made national VKS Military Space Forces day. The plan was as follows:

These objectives also proved unrealizable. At best only single articles of some third generation space systems could be launched. Development of Zenit pads at Plesetsk and the Svobodniy cosmodrome stalled for lack of funds.

In a scramble to attract Western investment in the financial crisis that following the break-up of the Soviet Union, many proposals were made in the 1990-1996 period for commercial use of Russian spacecraft. Market realities meant that virtually none of these were realized.

TKS derivatives were offered as earth resources and material processing platforms (Tellura, Teknologia). Military communications systems were proposed for civilian use (Gonets). Many proposals were made that took advantage of the heavy payload capability of the Energia booster. These included Multipurpose Satellite Gals, Energia Control Sat, Energia Geostationary Platform, Globis (Energia Heavy Comsat), Energia Nuclear Waste Disposal, Energia Orbital Debris Remover, Energia Ozone Replenishment Satellite, Energia Polar City Illuminator, and Skif-DM.

Oreol-3
Spacecraft using AUOS bus are similar
Credit: NASA Renewed large scale radio astronomy and lunar and Mars exploration programs were suggested: KRT-25 Radio Telescope, Energia Lunar Base, Mars 1986, Mars 1989, Mars 1994, ERTA, and Mars Together. None of these grandiose projects went beyond the concept stage.

As the 1990's continued military and civilian satellite constellations could not be sustained. Key satellite and rocket components were only made in ex-Soviet states that wanted hard currency or high prices. No budget was available to continue programs. The unpaid workers of the space industry were however able to continue by using reserve rockets and spacecraft plus complete those units that were in the pipeline when the Soviet Union broke apart. Satellite constellations were replenished at a slow rate but kept at a minimally operational status by rearranging existing satellites.

Russian space launches meanwhile ground to a virtual halt. In July 1997 the VKS Space Force was dissolved as a separate service arm and incorporated, together with the anti-ballistic missile arm of the PVO, into the RVSN Strategic Rocket Forces.

The absolute nadir was reached in 1999, when Russia orbited only 16 satellites, one sixth the number in the last year of the Soviet Union. At the same time, lessons learned in the Kosovo conflict clearly showed the importance of space forces in modern warfare.

From this point, under the leadership of President Putin, Russian space began to revive. Launches were conducted in 2000-2001 to finally replenish military satellite constellations and return them to minimum operational levels (Glonass, Molniya-3, Orlets-2, Prognoz SPRN, Raduga-1, Strela-3, Tselina-2, US-PM, Yantar-1KFT, Yantar-4K1 and Yantar-4KS1). Development of the all-Russian Angara modular launch vehicle to finally replace earlier designs and move all Russian launch operations back to Russian territory was revived with new vigor. However funding was insufficient, progress was slow. The first Angara launch from Plesetsk only came in 2014, and Soyuz rocket launches from the new Vostochny/Svobodniy cosmodrome only began in 2016. Meanwhile the venerable Soyuz provided the world's only access to the International Space Station after the retirement of the American space shuttle in 2011. Numerous designs for a manned spacecraft to replace the Soyuz were announced but development was never funded.

As Russia entered the new millennium it was following a strategy of using existing military space systems to retain a minimum essential military space capability. Slow development of the Angara launch vehicle continued to be funded through successful commercial sales of Proton launch services and Zenit rocket engines. Secrecy in regard to new military satellite development was reimposed. The dim outlines of a modernized, lightweight, and more appropriate Russian space capability for the 2010's was emerging.

Soviet Space System Development Process

The concepts and plans for the first generation of Soviet spacecraft came from the visionary chief designers themselves - Korolev and Chelomei. During the course of the 1960's a more orderly process of specifying, developing, and deploying space systems was put into place. This was largely derived from established processes for aircraft and other military products.

The following describes the 'official' orderly process as it was supposed to be practiced. As was the case in the United States this process could be short-circuited by powerful Chief Designers, Generals, or Politicians. But to a large degree the space systems that went into production for use by the Soviet military followed this procedure.

Okean-O1
Okean-OE was similar.
Credit: NASA Soviet space projects and planning, like the rest of that society, worked on the national cycle of five year plans. The first steps leading to any space system was the execution of technology assessment, threat assessment, and cost trade-off studies to determine the requirements and possibilities for space systems that should be developed in the next five year plan (and normally deployed in the following five year plan). This was done by 50 TsNII KS MO (50th Central Scientific Research Institute for Space Systems of the Ministry of Defense) in co-operation with various space research institutions (TsNIIMASH, NIITI, Agat, NII Khimash, etc.). The final result was a draft five year plan including defense plans, draft specifications, preliminary flight test plans, etc. These plans were assigned code names and formed the basis for negotiation of the final five year plan between the power brokers in the military industrial complex.

Once the final plan was approved, it would be formalized in a decree of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Supreme Council of Government Ministers. The planning process had already generated a TTZ, or tactical-technical requirements document, for each new system. This specification included:

The TTZ would be the basis for the submission of draft projects for the system from interested and qualified design bureaus. This process was equivalent to the issuance by NASA or the Defense Department of a call for tender for a major new aerospace system.

The government decree provided the permission for the design bureaus to expend the internal funds necessary to create the draft project document (equivalent to use of Bidding, Proposal, Industrial Research and Development budget pools of US government contractors). Selection of a design bureau, and the decision whether to even proceed with development of the system, would only be made after submission of the draft projects. The steps involved in creating a draft project:

The draft proposal itself was typically executed in two phases:

Step 1: Advanced Project or Technical Proposal. This contained:

The Advanced Project was a rough first outline of the system, equivalent to a Feasibility Study or Budgetary Proposal in the United States. It was normally not reviewed outside of the design bureau, but instead formed the framework for completion of the definitive Draft Project.

Step 2: Draft Project. This was the document submitted to the customer. It contained:

The draft project was equivalent to a firm proposal to a US government customer for a new system. While subsystem design was not complete, the general layout and sizing of the internal equipment of the system was already pretty well fixed. The mass budget, schedule, and cost of the project were all firm values that the design bureau was willing to commit to.

In Soviet practice the draft project of each design bureau would be 'defended' in person, much as an academic dissertation might be defended, to a government commission consisting not only of customer representatives but the competing chief designers as well. Depending on the results of the review, as well as inevitable budget battles and politicking, one institute would be selected to proceed with development of the system (in at least one famous case - the RS-17 and RS-19 ICBM's - the leadership utterly deadlocked on the selection, resulting in two major systems meeting the same TTZ being developed and put into production).

If the decision was made to proceed, this would be formalized in another government decree. Typical steps in systems development included:

Until the end of the 1960's Soviet engineers concentrated more on flight test than development and qualification testing to achieve production systems. But the poor reliability of first generation military systems, and the loss of the moon race to the Americans due to the unreliability of the systems, resulted in major reforms in the early 1970's. The result was that by the 1980's the Soviets were putting even more emphasis on pre-flight ground qualification and development test than the Americans.

Soviet Space Quality Assurance

Spacecraft Quality Assurance

The 16 February 1961 decree 'On measures to improve military technology' laid the basis for institution of quality control by the military to improve the reliability of space systems. Prior to this the quality of space systems was assured primarily through the efforts of the Chief Designers - Korolev personally supervised shop work for the first Sputniks and cherry-picked the best components for the Vostok manned spacecraft.

Raduga capsule
Raduga capsule jettison from Progress
Credit: RKK Energia Position RK-75 in 1975 set forth new standards of reliability and addressed standardization issues. This addressed the problems that plagued numerous important satellites and piloted craft of the 1960�s (Zenit-2, -4, etc.). From the beginning of the 1970's, in response to resolution of the VPK Military-Industrial Commission, lessons from the RVSN missile forces and VMF naval forces in their missile programs were applied to improve space systems. This work was carried out by TsNIIMASH, 4 NII and 50 TsNII KS.

The steering committee Position RK-75 was founded on 1 July 1975, including Afanasyev, Karass, and Keldysh. RK-75 abolished the positions Zenit-2 and Zenit-4 confirmed by the VPK in 1965 and Position P and PRKK confirmed in 1969. Position 75 was authorized to consider:


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